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ARTICLES 
THE INTEGRATION GAME 
Abraham Bell* and Gideon Parch011WVsky** 
Despite studies indicating an increasing preference far integrated hous­
ing and legal measures against housing discrimination, housing segregation 
persists in American society. This Article addresses this seeming paradox by 
challenging Thomas ScheUing's classic tipping model as overly simplistic, 
and advancing in its stead a three-game mot:Ul of homeowner preferences. 
After characterizing the interplay of incentives that distorts homeO'l.llni!Y 
choices in resegregating neighbarhoods, the Article draws on techniques that 
have been developed to neutralize distortionary incentives in the stock market 
to propose four measures far combatting market incentives leading to resegre­
gation: home-equity insurance, realty sales taxes, institutional subsidies, 
and growth controls. While these techniques wiU not completely arrest 
resegregation, they will enable nonhiased homeowners to achieve their goal of 
racially integrated housing. In addition to increasing integration, these tech­
niques should create a separating equilibrium in which only racially biased 
individuals would choose to leave racially changing neighborhoods, thereby 
revealing their true colurs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Several decades after Brown v. Board of Education 1 and the beginning 
of the civil rights movement, the legacy of racism and racial segregation 
remains a shameful mark on American society. 2 Neither the invalidation 
* SJ.D. candidate, Harvard Law School. J.D., A.B., Univenity of Chicago. 
•• Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. This Article gready 
benefited from comments and criticisms by Ian Ayres, Kirsten Edwards, Bob Ellickson, Bill 
Eskridge, Assaf Hamdani, Alon Klement, Pamela Laufer, Chen Lichtenstein, Brett 
McDonnell, Ru.<i-�1 P{".arce, Dan Richman, Larry Rothenberg, Fred Schauer, Peter 
Siegelman, Adam Spiro, Andrew Warshall, and Ben Zipunky. For excellent research 
assistance we would like to thank Mark Kerr and Thomas Richards. 
1. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
2. A& the Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow observed, "(r]acial discrimination 
pervades every aspect of a society in which it is found.ft Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has 
Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. Econ. Penp. 91, 91 (1998). 
Residential segregation on the basis of race is, no doubt, one of the most troubling 
manifestations of the general phenomenon Arrow describes. Cf. Douglas S. Massey & 
Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underdass 9 
(1993} (hereinafter Massey & Denton, American Apartheid] ("Our fundamental argument 
1965 
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of racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, a nor the outlawing of 
priva�e housing discrimination in the Fair Housing Act of 19684 have 
eradicated urban and suburban racial segregation. Recent studies show 
that urban America is only marginally less segregated today than it was in 
the 1960s and 1970s, during the height of racial rioting.5 Worse yet, 
other studies demonstrate that one's neighborhood largely determines 
one's achievements.6 Living in the wrong neighborhood often means a 
poor education, greater exposure to crime, fewer positive role models, 
and inadequate municipal services. 7 Thus, the denial of housing oppor­
tunities on the basis of race inflicts additional harms on its victims beyond 
the already corrosive effect of racial discrimination. Paradoxically, still 
other studies show an increase in individual preferences of members of 
all ethnic groups for living in integrated communities.s The incongruity 
is that racial segregation-and its characteristic institutional fonn, the black ghetto-are 
the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of black poverty in the United 
States."); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racial Change and Social Policy, 441 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. 
&: Soc. Sci. 114, 122 (1979) (dubbing racial residential segregation the "structural linchpin 
of modem American race relations"). 
3. 334 u.s. 1 (1948). 
4. 42 u.s.c. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1994). 
5. See Massey &: Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 81 ("Despite the 
optimism of the early 1970s, a comprehensive look at trends and patterns of racial 
segregation within large metropolitan areas in the ensuing decade provides little evidence 
that the residential color line has diminished in importance."); David M. Cutler et al., The 
Rise and Decline of the American Ghetto, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 455, 495 ( 1999) ("[T)he level 
of segregation in urban America rose for nearly a century and then modestly declined." 
(emphasis added)); Richard H. Sander, Individual Rights and Demographic Realities: The 
Problem of Fair Housing, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 874, 884 (1988) [hereinafter Sander, The 
Problem of Fair Housing] (noting that "race still dictated residence in most cases, even 
though there was substantially more progress towards integration during the 1970s than 
during any other postwar period"). As most of these studies depend upon census data, the 
year 2000 census may modify this finding. 
6. See, e.g., John F. Kain &: john M. Quigley, Housing Markets and Racial 
Discrimination: A Microeconomic Analysis 297-98 (1975) (suggesting that housing 
discrimination may affect black wealth and employment opportunities); Massey Be Denton, 
American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 150 ("(W]here one lives detennines a variety of 
salient factors that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of 
housing, exposure to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's 
peers."): Gary Orfield, The Movement for Housing Integration: Rationale and Nature of 
the Challenge, in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy 18, 18 (John M. Goering ed., 
1986) [hereinafter Orfield, Housing Integration] ("[A) family's spatial 
location determines . . . the quality of schools, the level of municipal services, increases in 
housing value, relative tax burdens, ease of access to work. safety, and much else."). 
7. See generally David M. Cutler&: Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or Bad?. 1 12 
QJ. Econ. 827, 865 (1997). The authors calculated that a 1 3% decrease in segregation 
would eliminate approximately one-third of the gap between whites and blacks in 
schooling, employment, earning, and out-of-wedlock pregnancies. 
8. See, e.g., Lawrence Bobo et al., Changing Racial Attitudes Toward Residential 
Integration, in Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy, supra note 6, at 1 52, 168 
("[T]oday the dominant belief is that blacks deserve the same treatment and respect as 
whites, and that some degree of racial integration is a positive thing."); Orfield, Housing 
Integration, supra note 6, at 27 (�Most Americans believe that black and Hispanic people 
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of these two empirical findings-decreasing racial animus in the housing 
sphere and persistent racial segregation-has puzzled social scientists, le­
gal scholars, and policymakers. 
We argue that the solution to this puzzle lies in understanding the 
incentives that prompt individuals to take actions that strengthen racial 
segregation, even as these same individuals favor racial equality and inte­
gration. Traditional explanations of housing segregation have focused 
on the importance of the continuing pathology of racism.9 And indeed, 
we do not dispute that racism remains a persistent part of American life 
and plays a role in housing segregation. Yet, the traditional explanations 
fail to do justice to the complex web of motivations that make integration 
of the housing market such an elusive goal.1o In particular, they fail to 
should have equal access to housing and neighborhoods they can afford and whites say 
that they are ready to accept nonwhite neighbors.•); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Attitudes on 
Race and Housing: A Social-Psychological View, in Segregation in Residential Areas 21, 79 
(Amos H. Hawly &: Vincent P. Rock eds., 1973) [hereinafter Pettigrew, Attitudes on Race 
and Housing] (reporting that "[w]hite American attitudes toward open housing have 
become increasingly more favorable over the past generation" and that "(b)lack American 
attitudes.favoring open housing have remained stable, perhaps even strengthening in 
recent years"). 
Some now prefer the term "diversity" to "integration" on the grounds that 
"integration" suggests the assimilation of minorities into the majority culture, while 
diversity suggests the value of preserving minority cultures alongside mcyority ones. See j. 
Unn Allen, Rare Blend: Achieving, Maintaining Diversity Is No Easy Task, Chi. Trib., Nov. 
28, 1993, at WI. While we use the prevalent terminology of "integration" and 
"segregation." we do not suggest that integration requires the absorption of minority 
cultures into a mcyority culture. 
9. For example, in examining the potential causes of segregation Massey and Denton 
conclude that "[t]he persistence of racial segregation in American cities . . .  is a matter of 
race and not class." Massey &: Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 88; see also 
Douglas G. Glasgow, The Black Underclass: Poverty Unemployment and Entrapment of 
Ghetto Youth 31-52 (1981) (arguing that racism is a key factor in explaining continued 
racial segregation); Alphonso Pinkney, The Myth of Black Progress 1-17 (1984) (arguing 
that racism ill deeply embedded in American instinltiom): t.aWTence lk>.bo & Camille L. 
Zubrinsky, Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In­
Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?, 74 Soc. Forces 883, 883 (1996) (presenting 
research to support the hypothesis that racial prejudice-as opposed to perceived 
economic status or in-group preference-is the dominant factor perpetuating residential 
segregation). 
10. Our model of the dynamics of the market goes a long way toward erasing the false 
dichotomy between racial and economic motivations in housing segregation. See infra 
Part !V. For example, we do not accept the aDumptions underpinning the statement mar 
�[i]n Oak Park in the 1980s . . .  escalating housing prices may have been as responsible as 
the village's programs in stabmzing the suburb." Andrew Fegelman, City Segregation 
Moves to Suburbs Blacks Frozen Out of Some Areas, Chi. Trib., Feb. 27, 1991, § C 
(Chicagoland), at 1 (quoting Douglas Massey). On the contrary, as the rest of our Article 
makes clear, escalating housing prices must be seen together with Oak Park's equity 
insurance program and other "managed integration programs• as part of the mechanism 
by which homeowners' incentives are altered. In other words, the equity in5urance 
program and escalating housing prices are not distinct phenomena that can be treated 
separately; the two are intrinsically linked, and "managed integration programs" must take 
account of thill linkage. 
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take seriously the expressions of preference of most Americans for 
integration. 11 
We demonstrate the effects of these economic incentives by analyz­
ing the case of dynamic resegregation, a primary obstacle to integration 
in recent decades. Dynamic resegregation is the commonly observed 
phenomenon of gradual departure of white homeowners from neighbor· 
hoods undergoing changes in racial composition.12 Scholars tend to at­
tribute motives of racial animus to white homeowners fleeing from a 
I I. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing surveys showing 
Americans' preference for integration). It is possible to dismiss this problem as merely 
illusory by arguing that verbally expressed preferences should not be taken seriously at all. 
After all, talk is "cheap," and if people do not act upon the preferences they express, there 
is no reason to take them at face value. In a recent article, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir 
discusses this hypothesis as a potential explanation for the disparity between the 
preferences citizens express verbally with respect to provision of public gOO<b and their 
behavior as consumers. Ultimately, she rejects this hypothesis as "too simplistic" and 
opines that "the attitudes people express in the public sphere" also stem from "true 
commitment, responsibility, and solidarity." Daphna Lewinsohn·Zamir, Consumer 
Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 Yale LJ. 377, 391 
(1998). 
Similarly, social scientists Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo 
confront the question of whether •changes in [survey] responses mean anything" and 
conclude that responses are generally accurate, in that most respondents "feel some 
genuine belief' in integration. While respondents may also feel conflicting beliefs, the 
authors conclude that •[o]utright lying is probably rare." Howard Schuman et al., Racial 
Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 201-03 (1985). This finding is 
corroborated by the work of some other social scientists. See, e.g., Paul M. Sniderman & 
Thomas Piazza, The Scar of Race 56-65, 141-46, 172-74 (1993) (examining question of 
"whether you can take a person at his word when he says he supports racial equality" and 
finding that survey responses are generally accurate). But cf. Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. 
Sanden, Divided By Color 270 (1996) (noting results of some social scientists, including 
Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, showing that changes in white survey attitudes might not result 
in similar changes in support for racially beneficial policies). 
12. As Gary Orlield points out: 
Segregation is not a fixed phenomenon-it is dynamk, constantly spreading, and 
usually associated with a wide range of negative developments for affected 
minority communities over time. . . . [A]Ithough the first minority families 
moving into white areas near ghettos or barrios often have higher incomes and 
status than the whites they buy from, often epitomizing the very values that the 
local whites claim to defend most vigorously, the white majority commonly views 
them as harbingers of the neighborhood's rapid racial transformation and 
decline . . . . Whites then proceed to act in ways that make this self-fulfilling 
prophecy come true, 
Orfield, Housing Integration, supra note 6, at 21; see alw Pettigrew, Attitudes on Race and 
Housing. supra note 8. at 76-79 (discussing computer simulations showing the effect of 
purchasing power, prejudice, and other variables on resegregation). 
A famous variant of dynamic segregation is the case of "white flight." The term "white 
flight" refers to a massive exodus of white homeowners from predominantly white 
neighborhoods following the entry of a handful of black families. White flight was 
common in the 1940s to 1960s when black demand for housing far exceeded supply, and 
only a few white neighborhoods opened their doors to black residents. The two 
distinguishing characteristics of white flight were the panic that accompanied the white 
exodus and the short period of time-typically two to three years--during which target 
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neighborhood increasingly populated by racial minorities. 13 But the true 
picture is much more complex. 
Imagine a white homeowner in "Whiteacresville," a predominantly 
white, middle class neighborhood in a typically segregated American city. 
One day, she notices that an Mrican-American family has moved into a 
house down the s treet. Several days later she observes several "for sale" 
signs in the neighborhood. She welcomes the opportunity, finally, to live 
in an integrated neighborhood, but several matters concern her. First, 
and most importantly, she has heard that other neighborhoods in the city 
that underwent racial change have not stabilized as integrated neighbor­
hoods but, rather, have become resegregated minority neighborhoods. 
Second, in other neighborhoods where this resegregation has occurred, 
the value of real-estate dropped substantially and never recovered. She 
has been told that those who sold first received the best prices for their 
houses while those who waited received considerably lower prices. Third, 
in saying that she would prefer to live in an integrated neighborhood she 
means a neighborhood consisting of 80% whites and 20% blacks. The 
enjoyment she will derive from living in a neighborhood with a different 
racial composition is significantly lower. Finally, she suspects
' 
that her 
neighbors' preferences regarding the ideal mix for integration differ 
from hers. 
That evening, she returns home to discuss her options with her 
spouse or partner. As long as the two of them believe that all the observa­
tions made earlier that day are correct, they will decide to sell their house 
immediately, unless their preference for integration-even as a member 
of a white minority in a majority black neighborhood-is sufficiently 
strong. 14 
neighborhoods were abandoned by whites. Sander elaborates on the difference between 
white flight and resegregation: 
[R]esegregation does not depend on uwhhe flightN; it can come just as inexorably 
(though more slowly) from a simple imbalance of white and black demand. 1t is a 
group phenomenon, caused not by any individual's characteristics or preferences 
but by the summation and interaction of those characteristics and preferences. 
Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 897. Yet, dynamic resegregation 
and white flight are not analytically unf'elated. They are united by the fact that in both 
cases, market expectations dictate certain individual behavior. Thus, the two phenomena 
have a lot in common, and essentially differ in degree, not in kind. 
13. See Orfield, Housing Integration, supra note 6, at 21 ("The belief in the 
inevitability of ghetto expansion • . .  [has] been the dominant perspective of researchers 
who have shaped scholarly understanding of racial change."); see also Massey&: Denton, 
American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 92-96 (describing whites' apprehension about Hving 
in mixed neighborhoods as the principal obstacle to integration); Sander, The Problem of 
Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 892 n.l58. 
14. Although we use the terms ublackN and "white" in our analysis, we do not mean to 
suggest that other minority groups do not suffer from housing segregation. We explicitly 
recognize the faCl that dynamic resegregation may be triggered by entry of other minority 
groups into white neighborhoods. However, there is a wide agreement among scholars 
that the problem of housing segregation is especially acute in the case of African­
Americans. As Massey and Denton obseJVe of the various ethnic groups in the United 
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There are several things to note about this example. First, one may 
contribute to resegregation even though one places a positive value on 
living in an integrated neighborhood. Indeed, as in the example, even 
homeowners who harbor no racial animus may rationally decide to sell. 
Second, so long as one believes that an integrated neighborhood is not 
the expected outcome of the change in the neighborhood's racial com­
position, one's preference for an integrated neighborhood does not pro­
vide a sufficient motivation to stay. Third, even if it is possible for the 
neighborhood to become and remain integrated, one might nevertheless 
decide to sell in light of the failure to achieve the desired mix of integra­
tion, and the expected drop in one's house's market price. Thus, in the 
example, if she believes that the neighborhood will eventually stabilize 
with a white minority, she may still decide to sell. Fourth, the key pre­
sumption that underlies the homeowner's decision is the belief that irre­
spective of her decision, there will be rapid changes in the racial composi­
tion of her neighborhood that will lead to a neighborhood lacking the 
desired racial mix and to reductions in the value of her house. It makes 
no difference to the homeowner's decision to sell her house that the ex­
pected drop in housing values stems from racial animus or racial stere­
otyping. Although the stereotypes that lead to expectations of changes in 
housing prices may be unfounded, and, indeed, the expected price 
changes may never materialize, so long as these expectations are wide­
spread, the homeowner will respect them in making her decision. Fifth, 
after minority group members-who are segregation's primary victims­
the ones most likely to bear the cost of resegregation are those who value 
integration the most, that is, white integrationists who choose to stay de­
spite the decrease in property value. While the segregated neighborhood 
satisfies the segregationist, it confounds the wishes of the integrationist, 
who never achieves her preferred living arrangement. 
A final note about the example. Our analysis is from the perspective 
of the white homeowner because the white homeowner is the driving 
force behind resegreg-ation. As is evident from our subsequent analysis, 
in utilizing this perspective, we do not intend to suggest that the perspec­
tive of the white homeowner is in any way more valuable than that of the 
black owner.l5 On the contrary, our goal is to guarantee the freedom of 
States, "[o}nly blacks experience a pattern of corutant, high segregation that is impervious 
to socioeconomic influences.ft Massey & Denton . AmeriClln Apartheid, supra note 2, at 88. 
Additionally, we recognize that American society cannot be neatly divided into "white" 
and "black" groupings. Americans come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and 
heritages, and many do not fit neatly into either category. Moreover, many reject the racial 
clas.sifications as inherently limiting, or even divisive. We do noL opine on the general 
desirability of these racial classifications. However, they are necessary markers in the study 
of housing resegregation. In a sense, "white• and "blackft can be viewed as placeholders for 
a dominant majority and subordinate minority racial grouping. 
15. A full study of resegregation must examine twin pairs of resegregation 
participants, potential white tmigrts from and black entrants into white neighborhoods, 
and potential black emigres from and white entrants into black neighborhoods. The white 
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choice of minority homeowners by changing the choice dynamics in the 
housing market. 
The pressure on homeowners to sell during periods of dynamic 
resegregation, as described in our example, is in many ways similar to the 
pressure on owners that arises in other contexts, such as the pressure on 
shareholders to sell stock during tender offers. In both cases, the dynam­
ics of the "panic sale" may make it rational for individual shareholders or 
homeowners to sell their assets (stock or houses), even though sharehold­
ers or homeowners as a group would be better off if the "panic sales" did 
not take place. Indeed, as Professor Lucian Bebchuk has shown, coercive 
tender offers wiJI lead shareholders to sell shares at prices that they be­
lieve are less than the "actual" value of the shares.l6 Curiously, while 
scholarship has been prolific on the distorting effects of certain tender 
offers on shareholders • decisions to sell their shares, 17 scant attention has 
been paid to the distorting effects of the dynamics of white flight on 
homeowners' decisions to sell their houses. Although Thomas Schelling 
noted the ability of benign motives to lead to housing segregation more 
than twenty years ago,18 others have failed to elaborate on his core insight 
and to engage in a critical examination of the preferences of and pres­
sures on homeowners in neighborhoods undergoing changes in racial 
composition.19 Specifically, no one has attempted to take Schelling's 
neighborhood has been the traditional arena for resegregation, and white �migr�s the 
traditional cause: consequently, we have chosen to focus on the first half of the first pair. 
As controversy about gentrification grows, the second pair will have to be examined as an 
arena for potential resegregation as well. Cf. infra note 61 (discussing supply-side and 
demand-side proposals for overcoming segregation). 
Finally, we do not intend to suggest an equivalence between black and white 
separationism. Separation of minorities as a result of their voluntary choice is sometimes 
viewed as a positive or even necessary step toward preservation of the minority culrure and 
social cohesiveness. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
16. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistortcd Choice and Equal Treatment in 
Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. I� Rev. 1695, 1696 (1985) [hereinafter &bchuk, To�rd 
Undistorted Choice] (describing distoned and inefficient outcomes caused by pressures 
on shareholders to tendet). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 1697 nn.7-9; John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for 
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate 
Governance, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1175-98 (1984) (explaining how target shareholders 
may be compelled to sell theit shares at a loss); Manin Upton, Takeover Bids in the 
Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. Law. 1017, 1025 (1981) (noting 
seveTll  in�tances where shareholders benefited from rejecting tender offers they originally 
wanted to accept); Roben A. Ragauo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging 
the Unocai/Revlon Gap, 35 Ariz. L Rev. 989, 1008-22 (1993) (arguing that a board of 
directors should employ defensive measures when such defenses increase shareholder 
value and avoid distoned outcomes). 
18. See Thomas Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J. Mathematical Soc. 
143, 143-45 (1971) (hereinafter Schelling, Dynamic Models]. 
19. See Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The 
Diverging Paths of Urban America, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 977, 988 (1998) (hereinafter 
Sander, Housing Segregation] ("Schelling's important theoretical work has been almost 
completely neglected in empirical srudies of segregation."). Curiously, even where 
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game-theoretic perspective one step further by devising legal and institu­
tional solutions that alter the economic incentives that apply to home­
owners in racially changing neighborhoods. Worse yet. no one has un­
dertaken to rectify the limitations of Schelling's model from a game­
theoretic perspective. Our goal in this Article is to redress this omission 
and craft a game-theoretic framework for solving the problem of dynamic 
resegregation. 
We base our proposed solution on two insights. Our core insight is 
that the key to resolving the problem of residential segregation lies in 
mapping the complex interplay of homeowner motivations. We show 
that the housing market in many American cities displays the characteris­
tics of three types of games: ( 1) the resegregation game (in which the 
dominant strategy of white homeowners is to sell as fast as possible); (2) 
the integration game (in which only some white homeowners depart and 
stable integration results); and (3) the assurance game (in which both 
selling and waiting are stable equilibria, but in which market signals of 
impending sales lead to mass exodus).20 Thus, to overcome the problem 
of dynamic resegregation it is necessary to alter the economic incentives 
presently operating in the housing market. In doing so it becomes possi­
ble to change the payoff matrix into one whose dominant strategy is stay­
ing in an integrated neighborhood, or to signal players in the assurance 
game that selling will not be the inevitable outcome.21 
Our second insight is that in analyzing the distorted choice structure 
of homeowners in racially changing neighborhoods, it is useful to analo­
gize it to the market for corporate control. In particular, we will show 
that a comparison of the choice dynamics of shareholders and homeown­
ers is valuable not only in identifying the motivations that lead individuals 
to sell their assets, but also in crafting solutions to change the distorting 
scholan have purported to take note of Schelling's work. in studies of resegregation, they 
have still focused on racial animus rather than the dynamics of market preferences as the 
mechanism for creating resegregation. See, e.g., Margalynne Armstrong, Race and 
Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. 1051, !052-53 (1998) 
(acknowledging the "shameful reality that black-owned real property appreciates at lower 
rates than comparable property owned by whites and thus becomes less valuable than it 
would be if the owner were white," but nevertheless arguing that selling property in 
response to expected changes in realty values is merely an uexcuse[ ) to ... avoid 
integrating"); Michael R. Tein, Comment, The Devaluation of Nonwhite Community in 
Remedies for Subsidized Housing Discrimination, 140 tJ Pa, L Rev. 1463, 1482-8' (1992) 
(acknowledging that "white flight may occur to some degree," but nevertheless arguing 
that Mit is wholly inappropriate for courts to shape remedies around racist responses"). 
20. The terminology for the first two games is our own. For a discussion of the 
assurance problem, see Amanya K. Sen, Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of 
Discount, 81 QJ. Econ. 112, 114-15 (1967). For a discussion of the assurance game, see 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note II, at 392-99 and sources cited therein. 
21. Overcoming the problem of dynamic resegregation will mean (1) if a payoff 
matrix generating a resegregation game exists, altering the economic incentives in the 
housing market to form a matrix that will generate an integration game, and (2) if an 
assurance game exists, signaling players that selling will not be the inevitable outcome. 
2000] THE INTEGRATION GAME 1973 
effects of market panic. The study of the choice dynamics of sharehold­
ers has advanced well beyond simple game theory grids. Legal and eco­
nomic scholars have developed techniques and modes of analysis whose 
sophistication is matched only by the colorfulness of their attendant 
jargon. The multitude of techniques generated by the challenge of 
tender offers-poison pills, shark repellents, pac-man defenses, and the 
like-can supply similarly creative responses to the pathologies of white 
flight and resegregation. These techniques, and others, share one com­
mon characteristic: They all alter the incentive structure of buyers and/ 
or sellers in the relevant market. More pertinently, they enable policy­
makers or takeover targets to neutralize the market distortions caused by 
panic and thereby permit market participants to reach decisions that are 
consistent with their true preferences and which maximize social welfare. 
By the same token, we propose the adoption of mechanisms in the hous­
ing market that neutralize the effects of panic and enhance social welfare. 
Of course; there are a number of relevant distinctions between the 
stock market and the housing market. However, these distinctions do not 
ultimately undermine our methodology; they only necessitate certain ad­
justments in the importation of the techniques employed in the corpo­
rate context into the housing contexL By utilizing the right techniques, 
policymakers can alter the incentive structures that lead to white flight. 
We draw on the stock market techniques used to eliminate panic and 
other distortions to devise a set of measures for remedying the distortions 
in racially changing housing markets. 
Specifically, we propose four techniques-home-equity insurance, 
realty sales taxes, institutional subsidies, and growth controls-that alter 
the payoff structure for participants in the housing market and create 
reassuring signals to combat the presumption of eventual resegregation. 
First, equity insurance, properly implemented, can imitate the effects of 
some versions of the pqison pill, which compensate shareholders who sell 
their shares in the .. back end," thereby eliminating the incentive to sell 
quickly in the face of racial change. Second, a tailored home sales tax 
produces effects similar to this variety of poison pill, and, in addition, 
generates a "cooling-off' period during which homeowners can rationally 
evaluate their options. Cooling-off periods have proven important in 
combatting distortions in the market for corporate control.22 Third, sub-
22. Cooling-1:>ff periods have been widely utilized in the context of t.l]e market for 
corporale control, both in legislation and in defensive techniques such a.s the deadhand 
poison pill. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poi11on Pills, Deadhand Pill.s, and 
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L Rev. 5ll, 512-14 
(1997); Dale Arthur Oesterle, Delaware's Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and 
Who Gets Iced, 13 Del. J. Corp. L. 879, 879-88 (1988). Cooling-off periods have also 
proven useful outside the context of the market for corporate control. The most notable 
example of that is the installation of "circuit breakersB inro the New York Stock Exchange 
following the October 1987 market fall. The circuit breakers were designed to "slow the 
action on turbulent days and give cooler heads a chance to prevail." John J. Phelan, Jr .• 
Setting Controls on Volatility in the Securities Market. Chi. Trib., Nov. 6, 1989, § I, at 19. 
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sidies for community institutions resemble "flip-over" techniques from 
the market for corporate control, thus granting non-selling homeowners 
the benefits of remaining in an integrated neighborhood. Fourth, we 
show that regional growth controls, like "pac-man defenses" in the mar­
ket for corporate control, can reverse market dynamics and discourage 
resegregation. To be sure, these techniques hardly exhaust the list of 
mechanisms that can be borrowed and adapted from the field of securi­
ties and corporate control. Nor does our analysis of the incentive struc­
ture of dynamic resegregation exhaust the myriad phenomena that lead 
to segregation. But the central insights of this Article regarding the eco­
nomic incentive structure that accompanies resegregation should guide 
policymakers seeking strategies to foster a more integrated American 
society. 
It is unlikely that the measures we propose will eradicate racial segre­
gation altogether. Indeed, it is quite likely that certain white homeown­
ers will prefer to pay above and beyond market price for segregated hous­
ing. To them, the elimination of all financial incentives to engage in 
dynamic resegregation will not matter, as they are driven by racial animus 
for which they may be willing to sacrifice a great deal. Thus, we cannot 
submit that our proposed scheme will uproot racism completely. Yet, the 
game-theoretic perspective we develop offers two significant benefits over 
the existing situation. First, it is likely to reduce dramatically residential 
resegregation in the United States. Second, it leads to a separating equilifr 
rium in which racially motivated homeowners will be forced to separate 
themselves from the rest of the public. By neutralizing the economic bias 
to resegregate, we make racially driven homeowners reveal their true col­
ors and deal with the social consequences of their preferences. Conse­
quently, implementation of our proposal will prevent racially motivated 
homeowners from seeking refuge in economic rhetoric as a justification 
for their racial preferences. This, in turn, will finally enable policymakers 
to combat effectively the racial roots of residential segregation, There­
fore, even if our proposal does not result in the elimination of residential 
segregation, it constitutes a major step toward achieving that goal. More­
over, the adoption of our proposal would place the cost of dynamic 
resegregation on the parties who most strongly resent housing 
integration. 
Structurally, the Article consists of five parts. In Part 1, we describe 
the phenomenon of segregation and its historical development in the 
United States. In Part II, we turn to dynamic resegregation. Mter sum­
marizing Thomas Schelling's popular tipping model, we offer an alterna­
tive game-theoretic analysis that explains the incentives leading to dy­
namic resegregation. In this Part, we challenge Schelling's game­
theoretic model of resegregation and present an alternative three-game 
model of the dynamics of the housing market. In Part III, we compare 
the incentive structure that leads to distorted choices in response to 
tender offers and discuss several techniques that have been used to com-
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bat panic sales in this context. In Part IV, we derive our solutions for the 
problem of dynamic resegregation from our analysis of tender offers. We 
propose equity insurance, transaction taxes, institutional subsidies, and 
growth controls as likely mechanisms for correcting the distortions of 
preference that encourage white flight and resegregation. Finally, in Part 
V, we address seveial potential objections to our proposed solutions on 
moral, legal, and practical grounds. 
I. THE SEGREGATION PATHOLOGY 
Of the various problems facing American society, segregation in the 
housing market is no doubt one of the most persistent and troubling 
ones. In addition to the abstract inequity inherent in any differential 
treatment of human beings on the basis of race, housing segregation in­
flicts numerous concrete harms on its victims. Segregation restricts em­
ployment opportunities for minorities, perpetuates education gaps, and 
creates an environment congenial to crime and a host of other social 
pathologies. 2s These social problems reinforce and perpetuate negative 
stereotypes against blacks and other minorities, which, in tum, diminish 
the likelihood of achieving residential integration. Thus, housing segre­
gation creates a vicious cycle for blacks and other minorities, preventing 
them from becoming equal citizens in American society.24 In the follow­
ing sections we will review the history of housing segregation in the 
United States and analyze its causes. 
A. A Review of the History of Modem Housing Segregation 
Modem housing segregation dates back to the Great Migration of 
blacks to the northern United States.25 While the causes of segregation 
have changed over time, the magnitude of the problem has remained 
relatively static over the last half century.26 In a recent study, Professors 
23. See, e.g., Tom C. Clark & Philip B. Perlman, Prejudice and Property: An Historic 
Brief Against Racial Covenants 1 4  ( 1 948) (describing-in a brief written by the United 
States Attorney General and Solicitor General, and submitted before the Supreme Court 
on behaJl of the Jwtice Department-the deleteriow social impact of segregation 
resulting from racial restrictive covenants); Sander, The Problem of Fair Howing, supra 
note 5, at 875 (describing the persistence of the urban ghetto, which "isolates many blacks 
from employment opportunities in the suburbs, perpetuates segregation in the schools, 
and creates an environment where crime, gangs. drug use, and a range of other social 
problems flourish�). 
24. See Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy 623 (1944) .  
25. See, e.g., St. Clair Drake &: Horace R .  Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of  Negro 
Life in a Northern City 1 74-82 (1 945) (describing the formation and perpetuation of 
racially segregated neighborhoods in Chicago); see also Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: 
The Making of a Negro Ghetto 1890-1920, at 1 1-27 ( 1967) (describing this .same process 
by studying the Great Migration). 
26. See, e.g., Sander, Housing Segregation, supra note 19, at 978 (asserting that 
despite the civil rights achievements of the 1 960s, kblacks continued to be extraordinarily 
segregated"); DouglasS. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Trends in the Residential Segregation 
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Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor divide the modem history of segregation into 
three periods, each characterized by a different set of causes. The first 
period, 1890 through 1940, witnessed the emergence of the black ghetto 
and its evolution into a widespread phenomenon. This period was char­
acterized by a massive migration of blacks from the agricuJtural South to 
the industrial North, a movement that dramatically transformed the ra­
cial composition of urban residential areas. Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 
report that "[i]n 1890, the average urban black lived in a neighborhood 
that was 27 percent black; by 1940, that neighborhood was 43 percent 
black."27 Throughout that period, segregation resulted from the prefer­
ences and actions of both whites and blacks. While whites favored segre­
gation because of racial animus towards blacks,28 blacks chose to flock 
together for a completely different reason. For blacks, and other minori­
ties, clustering together facilitated the transition to the new environment 
of the urban North.29 As was the case with many immigrant groups that 
arrived in America, living among their own enabled blacks to preserve 
of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980, 52 Am. Soc. Rev. 802, 823 (1987) 
(contending that socioeconomic changes from 1970-1980 bore little impact upon patterns 
of segregation). 
27. Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 456. A note on methodology is in order here. In 
measuring segregation, social scientists employ two main indices: dissimilarity and 
isolation. The dissimilarity index measures the degree to which blacks and whites are 
separated. Essentially, the index gauges what proportion of the black population in a 
certain geographical area will have to move to accomplish equal racial distribution in that 
area. For instance, a dissimilarity index of one indicates complete segregation. The 
isolation index measures the degree of exposure of white to black and vice versa. The 
isolation index supplements the dissimilarity index in that it broadens the inquiry beyond 
the neighborhood unit in order to account for possible interaction between blacks and 
whites. See id. at 458-59. See generally Otis Dudley Duncan & Beverly Duncan, A 
Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes, 20 Am. Soc. Rev. 210 (1955) (describing 
indices of segregation). 
The aforementioned indices are by no means the only ones that are used for 
measuring segregation. After reviewing the literature, Massey and Denton enumerated 20 
different indices that are used for this purpose. See DouglasS. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, 
The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, 67 Soc. Forces 281,309-10 (1988). Of the 20, 
Massey and Denton chose five for their own study. In addition to the dissimilarity and 
isolation indices, they also employed (1) a concentration index to measure the amount of 
space occupied by the minority group, (2) a clustering index to determine the adjacency of 
minority neighborhoods, and (3) a centralization index to measure the proximity of 
minority neighborhoods t o  the city center. See id. at 310-11. 
ln light of the plurality of indices and the lack of uniformity in using them, it is not 
surprising that different studies give rise to different results as to the degree and 
magnitude of segregation. Yet, all the studies are in agreement that housing segregation 
remains an acute social problem. 
28. See, e.g., Myrdal, supra note 24, at 623-24 (desc.ribing lhe racial prejudice and 
economic interests behind the flight of whites from urban neighborhoods and those 
whites' legal efforts to enforce racial segregation); Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, 
supra note 5, at 877 (observing that during that period, especially after World War I, many 
whites saw blacks "as an economic and social threat"). 
29. See generally Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 475 (suggesting immigram solidarity as 
a plausible explanation for segregation). 
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their cultural heritage, and recreate social and religious institutions that 
softened the adjustment to the new reality.30 At the same time, whites 
employed various legal and illegal means to thwart any attempts at inte­
gration. These included racial zoning ordinances,81 racially restrictive 
covenants, organized realtor practices, and racial violence.82 Hence, it is 
highly likely that segregation would have occurred during that period ir­
respective of the preferences of blacks. 
The second period, 1940 tht6ugh 1970, was marked by an expansion 
of segregation. Continuing migration to urban centers exacerbated pre­
existing racial tensions, and ghettos were created in rriany city centers. 88 
By 1970, segregation had reached unprecedented heights. Cutler, 
Glaeser, and Vigdor estimate that in 1970, "the average black in urban 
America lived in a neighborhood that was 68 percent black, "84 and 
Sander adds that in that year, "roughly seven out of every eight blacks in 
large U.S. cities . . .  resided in a ghetto."85 During this period, segrega­
tion was perpetuated, and expanded, by means of "concerted group ra-
30. Scholars have recognized the potential benefits of pooling together. See, e.g., 
Davis McEntire, Residence & Race: Final and Comprehensive Report to the Commission 
on Race and Housing 1 33 (1 960) (noting that segregation studies may include both 
enforced and voluntal}' segregation);  Roy L Brooks, Analyzing Black Self-Esteem in the 
Post-Brown Era, 4 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rrs. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1995) (• [B] Iack institutions 
rather than white (or integrated) institutions are the key to the development of healthy 
black self�steem �) . But cf. Spear, supra note 25. at 53-54, 225-27 (noting rise of separatist 
Racial Solidarity movement in Chicago as a response to discrimination, but arguing that 
the movement was ultimately unsuccessful). 
For a discussion of the benefirs pulling together offered to immigrants see Drake & 
Cayton, supra note 25, at 174 (•It is not unusual for a language, nationality, or racial group 
to begin life in the city as a 'colony. " ') ;  Herbertj. Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and 
Class in the Life of Italian-Americans 15-16 ( 1962) ( "The sharing of values was also 
encouraged by the residential stAlbility of much of the population."). This phenomenon is 
widely known as the "port of entry" theol)'. 
To be sure, there existed important differences between immigrant communities and 
.Vrican-lunerican commun ities. Culturally, and, of coof3e, lingui.u.kally, the transition 
might have been easier for Mrican-Americans than it was for other immigrant groups. Vet 
in both cases, creating separate communities helped the newcomers adjust more quickly to 
the new lifestyle im posed by the new environment. 
3 1 .  Such ordinances were ulti mately held unconstitutional and unenforceable in 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
32. See, e.g., Clark & Perlman, supra note 23, at 14 ( "Racial covenanrs have a 
dominant role in maintaining and enforcing this pattern of Negro residential 
segregation .");  Drake & Cayton, supra note 25, at 178-80 (listing numerous violent 
activities carried out by whites to create and enforce race segregation ) ;  McEntire, supra 
nate 30, at 241-45 (describing the role of real�stAlte brokers in enforcing and creating 
race segregation); see also Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 877 
(suggesting that violence, restrictive covenants, realtor practices, and poverty could all have 
contributed to racial segregation) .  
33. See Cutler e t  al., supra note 5 ,  at 456. 
34. ld. 
35. Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 883 (noting, however, that 
"this is an oversimplificationK). 
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cism .. ,6 on the part of white property owners. At the beginning of this 
period, the most widely used mechanism of exclusion was restrictive ra­
cial covenants that barred sales of property to minorities.s7 Professors 
Clark and Perlman suggested in 1948 that restrictive racial covenants 
were inserted into eighty percent of the deeds in certain areas.M The use 
of racially restrictive covenants as a lawful means of exclusion came to an 
abrupt end in the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer. sg In Shelley, the 
Supreme Court ruled that even though racial covenants are private agree­
ments that do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, their enforcement 
by the Court would violate it.40 However, by that time, racial segregation 
was a fait accomplis, 41 and while the Court's intervention successfully 
blocked the proliferation of the malady by legal vehicles, it failed to reach 
its deeper social roots.42 At that stage, segregation was an already preva­
lent social reality, and this kind of judicial effort alone could not eradi­
cate it. Even though the Supreme Court's ruling in Shelley declared ra­
cially restrictive covenants legally unenforceable, white homeowners 
continued to honor them, thus rendering the enforceability issue m oot. 43 
The other branches of the federal government finally joined the bat­
tle against segregation in the 1960s.44 The first salvo occurred in 1962, 
when President Kennedy issued an executive order that prohibited racial 
36. A synonymous tenn sometimes used in the literature is •collective action racism." 
See, e.g., Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 476 (describing an identical phenomenon as 
�collective action racism").  
37. See Clark &: Perlman, supra note 23, at 1 4; Massey &: Denton, American 
Apartheid, supra note 2, at 36-37 (discussing the central role of restrictive racial covenants 
in the creation of ghettos) . 
38. See Clark &: Perlman, supra note 23, at 15,  88 n.23. 
39. 334 U.S. I ( 1948) .  
40. See id. at  1 3, 20. Consistent with this reasoning, the Court held five years later in  
Barrows v. ]tu:lr.son that a white seller who sold to blaclc.s, in violation of a racial covenant, was 
not liabl� to pay damages to his neighbofll. 346 U.S. 249, 251 ,  257 (1953) . Finally, in 1 968, 
in Jones v. Aljrtd. H. Mayer Co. , the Supreme Court ruled that section 2 of the 1 866 Civil 
Rights Act "ban all racial discrimination, private ;u well .u public, in the sale or rental of 
property." 392 U.S. 409, 4 1 3  ( 1968) . 
41 .  See Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 878. 
42. See id. at 89S ( noting that in the 1 950s and 1960s M(d] iscrimination was not only 
socially accepted but socially expec�d").  
43.  See McEntire, supra note 30, at 74-77. 
«. See Sander, The Problem of Fair HoWling, supra note 5, at 879-81 .  Before 
joining the struggle for integration, the government was often actively fighting on the 
opposite side. See Orlield, Housing Integration, supra note 6, at 23 ("The courts upheld, 
and the federal governmen t  strongly encouraged, a system of racial covenants that made 
integrated hoWling illegal in many are.u.");  Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra 
note 5, at 879 (suggesting that federal hoWling agencies "were at best indifferent towards 
residential segregation and often actively promoted it" (footnotes omitted));  see also John 
M. Goering, Introduction to § 4, Racial Desegregation and Federal Housing Policies, in 
Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy, supra note 6, at 1 97-200 (listing examples of 
government agencies, such ;u HUD, actively promoting and creating segregation) .  
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discrimination in any federally supported housing activity.45 Although 
the direct effect of the order was quite modest, 46 it spurred state and 
local legislation against discrimination, and popular pressure for more 
comprehensive legislation began to mount. In 1968, Congress enacted 
the Fair Housing Act. 47 Essentially, the Fair Housing Act effected three 
important changes in the housing market. First, it prohibited most own­
ers and renters from engaging in discriminatory practices in transactions 
involving their property. 48 Second, it extended the same prohibition to 
institutional actors such as real-estate brokers and mortgage lenders.49 
Finally, the Act called on the federal government to promote fair housing 
and establish adequate enforcement mechanisms. 50 Since the enactment 
of the Fair Housing Act, nearly all levels of American government have 
made continuous, consistent efforts to eradicate segregation. Alas, the 
dramatic change in the legal and political environments has had but a 
minimal effect on the prevalence of segregation as a social 
phenomenon.51 
Between 1970 and 1990, the third and final stage in Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Vigdor's scheme, segregation waned somewhat. However, the de­
cline fell far short of the optimistic expectations of integrationists. There 
is some disagreement among scholars in the field as to the exact rate of 
the dedine. Professors Massey and Denton, representing the pessimistic 
view, maintain that between 1 970 and 1990 segregation dropped by 
7.5%.52 Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, representing the more optimistic 
45. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 261 (1961-1962 ) ,  reprinted as amended in 
42 u.s.c. § 1982 ( 1 994). 
46. See Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 879-80 (noting that 
�the order affected only a small fraction of the nation's housing and lacked a weD-defined 
enforcement component") .  
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994) (Tide VIII of the Civil Rightll Act of 1968). I t  ill 
notc:WQrthy that there is an ongoing deba� as to the goal uf the Fair Holding A,t. U11der 
the more narrow view, the only goal of the Act was to eliminate discriminatory practices in 
the housing market. Under the more expansive one, dle goal of llle Act was not only to 
ban discriminatory practices, but also to promote integration in the housing market. For 
possible support for both views, see generally Tein, supra note 19, at 1466-67 (concluding 
that the expansive view ill doubtful given the text and legislative history of the Fair Housing 
Act) .  
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3612. 
49. See id. §§ 3605--3606. 
50. See id. §§ 3608-3614. 
51. See, e.g., Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 882-83 
(observing that �fair housing laws have barely dented the pe�Yc�Siveness of racial 
segregation") . 
52. See Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 471-72 (citing Massey & Denton, American 
Apartheid, supra note 2). Massey and Denton concluded that average segregation in the 
!10 residential areas with the largest black populations dropped by seven percentage pointll 
between 1 970 and 1990. See Massey & Denton, American Aparllleid, supra note 2, at 222 
tbl.8.1. 
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view, estimate the decline at 16.7%.58 Yet, even if the latter figure is cor­
rect, it is still striking that segregation was much more pervasive in 1990 
than it was in 1940. According to Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, " [b]y 1990, 
the average black lived in a neighborhood that was 56 percent black,"54 
and 98 of the 313  metropolitan areas constituting the database had a 
ghetto.55 In the same vein, in his 1988 study, Sander observed that "in 
many cities, over eighty percent of the black population lives in virtually 
all-black neighborhoods. "56 Furthermore, they observe that looking at 
segregation at a national level disguises a basic fact: " [T] he relative segre­
gation of different cities is very stable over time."57 Of the five most seg­
regated cities in 1890, three-Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit-have 
managed to retain this dubious distinction one hundred years later. 58 
These findings suggest that once segregation becomes prevalent in a cer­
tain area, banning its perpetuation by legal means is unlikely to reverse 
the trend.59 Indeed, the comprehensive legislative and judicial ban on 
discrimination alleviated the problem of "concerted," or "centralized," 
segregation, but it failed to remedy the problem of "decentralized segre­
gation." Law, after all, is not the only incentive affecting human 
behavior. 
Exploring the cause of the limited effectiveness of the Fair Housing 
Act, economists have found that after the Court banned discriminatory 
covenants and zoning, segregation has been maintained by collective ac­
tions on the part of white property owners. In their comprehensive study 
of discrimination in the housing market, Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor ob­
serve that "at the middle of the century, blacks paid relatively more for 
housing in segregated cities than in integrated cities," whereas " [b]y 
1990 . . .  whites pa[id] more for equivalent housing than blacks in more 
segregated metropolitan areas. "60 Mter the enactment of the Fair Hous-
53. See Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 472. The authors explain that the difference 
between the figure is attributable in pan to disagreement about definitions (i.e., who 
should be considered white and who should be considered a minority) and abo in patt 10 
the use of different samples. Cutler and his colleagues funher report that when they used 
Massey and Denton's sample, while retai ning their set of definitions, they found a decline 
of 10.8 percentage points. See id. 
54. Id. at 456. 
55. See id. at 47 1.  However, this figure actually represents a decline from the 
situation in 1970. See id. 
56. San der, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 875. 
57. Cutle1 et al., supra note 5, at 472. Mote .>pet:ifit:iilly, the authol's note that v (  t ! he 
correlation across cities between segregation in 1 890 and segregation in 1990 is as high as 
50%." Id. at 457. 
58. See id. at 457. 
59. Indeed, there is ample evidence that lhe impact of the Fair Housing Act was much 
more limited in areas in which segregation had been widespread at the time the Act was 
enacted. See Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 898-99 (contrasting 
Oakland, where attempts at integrating the city's large black ghetto have met with limited 
success and resegregation is substantial, with San Antonio, where attempts at integrating 
the small black population were relatively successful). 
60. Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 457. 
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ing Act, whites could no longer use centralized means of exclusion, and 
had to settle, instead, for a more expensive and less effective method of 
exclusion: decentralized segregation. Thus, although the Fair Housing 
Act did not eliminate the problem of segregation, it changed the primary 
method used to maintain it. 
At the end of the day, there are three important things to note about 
the effect of lhe Fair Housing Act on the problem of segregation. First, it 
eliminated the most effective and cheapest way to maintain segregation, 
and thus, increased the cost of pursuing this goal . Second, it passed the 
cost of maintaining segregation on to white property owners, forcing 
them to exclude minorities by fencing themselves in, rather than fencing 
minorities out. Third, and finally, it did not raise the cost of segregation 
sufficiently to eradicate the problem. The last point merits elaboration. 
Economic theory suggests that if the cost of maintaining segregation were 
higher than the benefits conferred by segregation, integration would re­
sult. Evidently, passing the cost of maintaining segregation on to white 
homeowners did not completely offset the benefits of segregation. Un­
derstanding why requires an in-depth analysis of the monetary and non­
monetary factors that impact the decisions of white homeowners in the 
face of a change in the racial composition of their neighborhoods.6 1 The 
next section undertakes this task. 
B. The Intricate Web of Racial and Monetary Motivations 
A review of the literature on housing segregation reveals two main 
hypotheses as to why white homeowners in segregated neighborhoods are 
averse to minority entry.62 The first, and more straightforward one, is 
6 1 .  Most commentators agree that the supply side is the key to maintaining 
segregated housing. See, e.g., Anmn.rong, supra note 1 9, at 1059 and sources cited therein. 
Although we focus on the supply side, we recognize that the demand side warrants 
auention as well. Unfortunately a full analysis of the demand side is beyond the scope of 
this Article. For an example of a �tudy discussing demand-side-oriented remedies (that 
unfortunately collapses racial and socioeconomic categories) , see J. Mark Powell, Fair 
Housing in the United States: A Legal Response to Municipal Intransigence, 1 997 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 279, 298-3 1 3  (discussing two types of demand-side remedies, mobility grants and •fair 
share• legislation, and concluding that they can be effective in fighting resegregation). 
Sander too has proposed demand-side subsidies. See Sander, The Problem of Fair 
Housing, supra note 5, at 931-32. Other discussions of demand-side proposals to 
overcome segregation may be found in Bruce S. Gelber, Race-Conscious Approaches to 
Ending Segregation in Housing: Some Pitfalls on the Road to Integration, 37 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 921 ,  958 ( 1 985) (arguing that measures such as affirmative marketing can promote 
racial integration without compromising the rights of homeowners) , and Suja A. Thomas, 
Note, Efforts to Integrate Housing: The Legality of Mortgage-Incentive Programs, 66 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 940, 944-52 ( 1991 )  (concluding that properly structured mortgage 
incentive programs can be valid under the intermediate scrutiny test and the Fair Housing 
Act) . 
62. See generally David R. Harris, "Property Values Drop When Blacks Move In, 
Because . . .  ": Racial and Socioeconomic Determinants of Neighborhood Desirability, 64 
Am. Soc. Rev. 46 1 ,  461 ( 1 999) (summarizing theories on white aversion to minority 
integration) . 
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aversion to minorities per se. 65 The second is fear of adverse economic 
effects associated with minority entry.64 Under the first view, it is pure 
racial animus that spearheads resegregation. Under the second, race is 
merely a proxy for negative economic implications--either real or per­
ceived. While both views are in agreement about the fact that race plays a 
crucial role in the decisionmaking process of white homeowners, they 
differ as to the reason. 65 
Champions of the pure racism hypothesis claim that whites' aversion 
to black neighbors stems from racism. Lawrence Bobo is the most nota­
ble herald of this view, which maintains that whites dislike blacks simply 
because of negative stereotypes.66 On this view, negative stereotypes of 
blacks and Latinos cause whites to resist integration, and prompt them to 
move out of neighborhoods into which blacks relocate.67 Yet, whites' 
aversion towards integration is not purely emotional. Bobo, as well as 
other commentators who subscribe to this view, explain that, for whites, 
residential segregation is the key to maintaining their longstanding privi­
leged social status. 58 Hence, whites "tend to view integration with any of 
63. See Bobo 8c Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 903. 
64. See Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the 
Detroit Area, 100 Am. J. Soc. 750, 759-61 ( 1994).  
65. Understanding the exact causes of segregation holds the key to solving the 
problem. In this context, Harris makes the following argument: 
If whites avoid blacks because they are black, then stable integration is unlikely; 
no matter what policy is pursued, whites will still object to living near blacks. 
Alternatively, if whites avoid blacks because of characteristics associated with 
being black, then stable integration can be achieved through policies that 
promote racial integration while minimizing undesirable nonracial 
characteristics. 
Harris, supra note 62, at 462. While we agree that identifying the cause or causes of 
segregation is a prerequisite for solving the problem, we do not share Harris's view that 
racial animus is an insunnountable obstacle. As we will show, even racial animus can be 
overcome if the expected payoff from staying in a racially changing neighborhood is 
sufficiently high, Granted. the cost of overcoming racial animu.<1 may he much higher than 
the cost of neutralizing the impact of negative economic effects associated with race. But 
this does not change the fact that, in principle, both problems can be cured. Thus, in 
contrast to Harris, we believe that from a policy standpoint the difference between the two 
hypotheses is one of degree-i.e., the price of remedying them-and not of kind. 
66. See Bobo 8c Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 904. A 1990 study by St. John and Bates 
provides some empirical support for this view. St. John and Bates found that whites in 
Oklahoma City rank neighborhoods lesa favorably as the percentage of black residents 
increa.."t"t<, even when crime r..ue, neighborhood cleanliness, inrerneighbor cohesion, and 
distance from city center were held constant. See Cr.aig St. John & Nancy A. Bates, Racial 
Composition and Neighborhood Evaluation, 19  Soc. Sci. Res. 47, 56, 58-60 (1990) . 
67. See Bobo & Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 904 (describing white resistance to 
residential integration) .  On the phenomenon of prejudice generally, see Gordon W. 
Allport, The Nature of Prctiudice, 14-15 ( 1 954) (describing manifestations of prejudice, 
including avoidance and discrimination). But see Irwin Katz, Gordon Allport's The Nature 
oJPrejudia, l 2 Poi. Psychol. l 25, 131-34, 1 46-53 ( 1991 )  (arguing that subsequent research 
shows that Allport's hypothesis is not sufficiently broad). 
68. See Bobo 8c Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 904; see also Massey &: Denton, American 
Apartheid, supra note 2, 1 82-85 (describing the systematic process by which whites turned 
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the minority groups as threatening or undermining a previous status rela­
tion of superiority. "69 
The proxy hypothesis assigns a different role to race. Under this hy­
pothesis, it is not racial animus per se, but rather various negative effects 
people associate with race that drive them to leave racially changing 
neighborhoods. That is, it is not minorities that whites are striving to 
avoid, but rather low socioeconomic status and the vices associated with 
such status. 70 The primary vices on the list include crime, poor educa­
tion, unemployment, and out-of-wedlock birth. These phenomena have 
an obvious undesirable impact on quality of life and consequently on 
real-estate prices.71 Social scientists have found that entry by low-socio­
economic-status residents often introduces the problems of poverty, drug 
use, and other types of crime, which reduce the motivation of other 
dwellers to invest time and effort in maintaining the neighborhood.72 
This, in turn, causes consistent deterioration in the condition of build­
ings and other neighborhood facilities. Once this process occurs, the 
more aflluent residents leave for better neighborhoods, and the less afflu­
ent families fill the vacancies created by their departure. Generally, the 
new residents lack sufficient financial means to improve, or even main­
tain, their homes, and further deterioration results. As this process con­
tinues, the downward trend becomes virtually irreversible, and real-estate 
values drop dramatically. Because many social problems that trigger 
neighborhood decay are disproportionately concentrated in neighbor­
hoods with large black populations, 78 many whites believe that the best 
way to avoid the problem is to live in a predominantly white neighbor-
blacks into the underclass) ;  Orfield, Housing Integration, supra note 6, at 20-21 (noting 
that ·the basic problem that integration addresses is the problem of white prejudice and 
the fact of institutional and individual discrimination in favor of whites and white 
communities�) .  
69. Bobo & Zubrinsky, supra note 9,  at 904. 
70, See generally Paul A. Jargo�ky, Poverty and Place: Ghettos. Barrio.'! and the 
American City, 89-1 1 5  ( 1997) (describing characteristics of high-poverty neighborhoods) ; 
Laurenj. Krivo &: Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban 
Crime, 75 Soc. Forces 619 ( 1 996) (documenting the tendency of economic disadvantages 
to cause crime i n  both white and black neighborhoods) .  In addition, these problems may 
lead to out-migration, which accelerates the formation of ghettos. See Massey & Denton, 
supra note 2, at 1 17 (noting phenomenon of out-migration) ; Harris, supra note 62, at 463 
(identifying "low incomes, weak attachmenu to the labor force, and low levels of 
education• as attributes people avoid in seeking a community in which to live) .  
7 1 .  Interestingly, Jencks and Mayer suggest that the adverse impact of  the social 
problems associated with low socioeconomic status is amplified by the belief of many white 
homeownen that these problem are contagious. This, in tum, prompu whites to stay away 
from neighborhoods of low socioeconomic status. See Christopher Jencks & Susan E. 
Mayer, The Social Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighborhood, in Inner City 
Poverty in the United States 1 1 1 , 1 13-14 (Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G. H. McGeary 
eds., 1990) . 
72. See generally Wesley G. Skogan, Disorder and Decline 77-84 ( 1 990) (describing 
impact of Mdisorder" on the housing market) . 
73. See Massey &: Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 1 48-81. 
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hood. Thus, under the proxy hypothesis, "racial preferences simply re­
present a desire to Uve in areas free of crime, deteriorating buildings, 
ineffective public schools, and other social ills. "74 
Interestingly, the bulk of the literature on segregation treats the two 
hypotheses as mutually exclusive, but, as David Harris correctly points 
out, there is no reason why it should be so.75 Both theories may explain 
continued racial segregation. Indeed, a certain percentage of the white 
population may oppose integration for purely racial reasons, while the 
remainder may be reluctant to pursue i t  for economic reasons. Moreo­
ver, both rationales may apply to the same individual; an individual may 
oppose integration for both racial and economic reasons. Purporting to 
cure this methodological flaw, Harris's 1999 study develops a new ap­
proach for gauging the relative roles of racial and nonracial factors in 
residential segregation. Rather than relying on respondents' responses 
to questioners-which may or may not reflect their true beliefs-Harris 
focuses on real-estate buyers' and sellers' actual preferences by analyzing 
housing prices in real market transactions. 76 He finds that prices of resi­
dential units drop by 16% when the percentage of blacks in a neighbor­
hood changes from less than 10% to 10-60%. Translated into dollar 
terms, this drop represents a $1 ,187 reduction in annual costs for the 
average dwelling unit. 77 A much steeper decline in real-estate value oc­
curs when the percentage of blacks exceeds 60%. In the latter case, Har­
ris estimates a loss of 46% of the annual value, which represents a $3,351 
reduction in annual housing costs for the average unit. 78 Based on these 
findings, Harris concludes that race effects on property values "are highly 
significant both statistically and substantively, and are consistent with the 
observation that 'property values drop when black families move in.' "79 
74. Harris, supra note 62, at 464. 
75. See id. (noting that " [m]any studies assess the importance of racial or nonracial 
neighborhood factors, rather than racial and nonracial neighborhood factors" but that 
researchers must examine both factors to distinguish between the pure discrimination 
hypothesis and the racial proxy hypothesis). But see Bobo & Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 
892-99, 904 (critically analyzing both theories and concluding that "individual and 
institutional discrimination" is the main cause of racial segregation in the United States);  
Harris, supra note 62, at 464. 
76. See Hanis, supra note 62, at 465-67. 
77. See id. at 471 .  
78. See id. This result i s  consistent with observations reported by other 
commentators. See, e.g., Farley et al., supra note 64, at 775-77 (noting drop in property 
value in Detroit as black population increased).  Harris reports considerable variation in 
price effects in different geographic submarkets: 
Westem housing loses no more than 33 percent of its value when located in 
neighborhoods that are more than 10 percent black. By contrast, reductions in 
annual costs are as much as 40 percent in the South, 52 percent in the Midwest, 
and 70 percent in the Northeast for dwellings located in neighborhoods that are 
more than 1 0  percent black. 
Harris, supra note 62, at 472 (footnote omitted) .  
79. Harris, supra note 62, a t  471 (quoting Farley et al. , supra note 64 ,  a t  775) . 
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In analyzing the causes of these price reductions, Harris posits that 
socioeconomic factors, such as "neighbors' income, employment status, 
and educational attainment are the significant neighborhood-level deter­
minants of property values in all regions."80 However, Harris's study does 
not completely discard the pure discrimination hypothesis. On the con­
trary, controlling for socioeconomic factors, Harris finds that the pure 
discrimination hypothesis does play a role in the decisions of white home­
owners. Moreover, he identifies a significant difference in attitude to­
wards black entry between white renters and white homeowners. 
Whereas rental property drops only marginally when the percentage of 
blacks exceeds 10%, owner-occupied units lose 21% of their annual 
value.81 This finding can be reconciled with the pure discrimination hy­
pothesis, which argues that race per se is a factor affecting property values 
and neighborhood desirability irrespective of other socioeconomic fac­
tors.8% It  is important to recogpize that only a unified account that takes 
both hypotheses into consideration can aptly capture. the causes of segre­
gation and provide a sound basis for institutional responses to the 
problem. 
II. DvNAMrc REsEGREGATION AND GAME THEORY 
A ScheUing's Dynamic Model of Segregation and Its Limits 
Having examined the history of segregation and its causes, we now 
turn to the mechanisms by which segregation is maintained. In this sec­
tion, we examine in depth the dynamic model of segregation-the model 
that best explains how segregation is being maintained in the post-Fair 
Housing Act era. We do so by first examining the popular tipping model 
developed by Thomas Schelling to explain why neighborhoods resegre­
gate. We then consider three shortcomings in Schelling's model and of­
fer a richer, alternative game-theoretic model to explain resegregation. 
1 .  Schelling's Tipping Model. - Thomas Schelling was the first to de­
velop a basic model of the choice stnltture of homeowners in situations 
of dynamic segregation.88 Schelling's tipping model is predicated on the 
assumption that whites vary considerably in their racial tolerance and, 
consequently, in their preferences for integration. When the first blacks 
move into a predominantly white neighborhood, they "tip out" the least 
tolerant whites, causing them to leave for a more white neighborhood. 
The departure of those whites creates vacancies that are filled by new 
black families, which leads, in tum, to the departure of additional whi tes 
80. Harris, supra note 62. at 474. 
81 .  See id. 
82. See, e.g., Bobo & Zubrinsky, supra note 9, at 903-04 (noting that elements of both 
hypotheses seem valid, but concluding that prejudice is more importan t as a factor) . 
83. See Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 1 40-55 (1978); 
Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in 
Racial Discrimination in Economic Life 1 59-62 (A. Pascal ed., 1972); Schelling, Dynamic 
Models, supra note 1 8, at 1 67-71.  
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who are only marginally more tolerant than the first to leave. Once 
again, black families· buy some of the housing units that have become 
available, thereby prompting still more whites to leave. I� the extreme 
case, this process will continue until the former predominantly white 
neighborhood becomes completely black. In intermediate cases, the pro­
cess will result in a predominantly black neighborhood with a white mi­
nority comprising mainly residents of low socioeconomic status. Thus, 
regardless of the end result, this dynamic of black entry and white depar­
ture vitiates the possibility of attaining sustainable integration. But why 
are there not intermediate equilibria? Why, for example, can't this pro­
cess lead to a racial composition of 50% whites and 50% blacks in equilib­
rium? After all, if whites really prefer integration, shouldn't they stop 
leaving at some point? Conversely, why do blacks keep moving into 
neighborhoods vacated by whites when they know that doing so will result 
in resegregation? To answer these questions, it is necessary to under­
stand the problem of "tipping points .. and its effect on resegregation. 
Numerous studies indicate that a majority of both whites and blacks 
prefers, or at least, does not object to, residential integration. 84 In re­
sponse to opinion polls, a majority of whites consistently expresses will­
ingness to live in a stably integrated area, especially with blacks who have 
a similar socioeconomic background.85 Moreover, in a national sample, 
66% of the white respondents expressed a preference for living in either 
a "mostly white," or a "half-white, half-black," neighborhood.s6 With re­
spect to blacks, the evidence supporting integration is even stronger. Not 
84. For example, a national poll conducted in 1976 indicated that 88% of the white 
respondents expressed the view that blacks should be able to live wherever they want. See 
Schuman et al., supra note l l , at 74-75; cf. Herbert H. Denton & Barry Sussman, Blacks, 
Whites Agree Blacks Have Gained, Differ on What's Ahead, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1 98 1 ,  at 
AI . However, the same poll found that 60% of whites thought that whites should be able 
to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods if they wanted to. See Schuman et al., supra 
note 1 1 .  at 74-75. 
Recent polls seem to corroborate these findings. See Kevin Sack & Janet Elder, Poll 
Finds Optimistic Outlook but Enduring Racial Division, N.Y. Times, July 1 1 ,  2000, at A I :  
8 5  percent o f  whites said they did not care whether they lived i n  a n  area where 
most of their neighbors were whhe or where most were black. But two-thirds of 
the whites said they thought most white people preferred to live in white areas. 
And perhaps most telling, 85 percent said they actually live in areas where they 
have no or few black neighbors, the same percentage that said they had no 
preference. 
The variations in responses may depend on how the questions are being framed. See 
Kinder & Sanders, supra nore l l , at 1 63-95, 
85. For a discussion of how economic forces can cause segregation despite 
preferences for inh:gration, see William A. V. Clark, Residential Segregation in American 
Cities, in Issues in Housing Discrimination 29, �5-36 (Hearings of the U.S. Comm'n on 
Civ. Rts., Nov. 1 2- 1 3, 1985, Volume 1 :  Papers Presented) ( 1 986) . 
86. Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 896 n. 189 (citing Clark, 
supra note 85, at �9) . But see Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 
92-93 (reviewing studies showing increasing white apprehensiveness as the proportion of 
blacks in a neighborhood rises). 
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only do opinion polls consistently demonstrate that a sizable majority of 
blacks favors integration,87 but actions taken by blacks also provide em­
pirical evidence of the expressed preference. For instance, a census study 
of the years 1967-1971 disclosed that during that period blacks who 
could afford to move into white neighborhoods attempted to do so, and 
about half actually moved.88 Given this evidence, the conclusion that 
generally both whites and blacks prefer to live in integrated neighbor­
hoods is ineluctable. Yet, this result is puzzling. If everyone prefers inte­
gration, why is segregation so prevalent? As is often the case, the devil is 
in the details. 
Although inost blacks and most whites prefer to live in integrated 
neighborhoods, they diverge widely as to the exact degree of integration 
they would choose. Indeed, as Sander points out, whites and blacks 
"often mean different things when they use the term [integration] ."89 
While for most blacks the optimal racial benchmark is roughly 50% black 
and 50% white,90 the ideal composition for whites is no more than 20% 
black.91 Strange as it may seem, this discrepancy between whites and 
blacks is the main obstacle to achieving residential integration. Given 
their stronger preference for integration, blacks will continue to move 
into a neighborhood until it becomes at least 50% black, but since this 
percentage exceeds whites' preference for black neighbors, whites who 
can afford it will leave en masse to other predominantly white neighbor­
hoods. Indeed, because each group is aware of the other's preference, 
resegregation commences once the first wave of blacks moves into a white 
neighborhood. Thus, once the first wave of blacks moves into a white 
neighborhood, resegregation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
More importantly, as we show in the next section, variations in pref­
erences between homeowners may translate, in the aggregate, into a situ­
ation in which an average preference for integration leads to segregation. 
87. See Massey &: Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 88-91 (revit:��ng 
various studies of blacks' attitudes toward integration, especially Detroit in the 1970s). 
88. A census study of the years 1967-1971 disclosed that during that period "fifty 
percent of middle-income blacks and forty percent of moderate-income blacks who moved 
within urban areas . . . moved into a unit previously occupied by a white household." 
Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 894 (citing Lany H. Long & 
Daphne Spain, Racial Succession in Individual Housing Units 15 (Bureau of the Census, 
Current Population Reports, Series P-23 No. 71 , 1978) ) .  
89. Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, supra note 5 ,  a t  896. 
90. See Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 93; see also Cutler et 
al., supra note 5, at 488 (reporting that 67% of blacks surveyed in 1982 preferred to live in 
a neighborhood that is half white and half black, or mostly white).  
91 .  See Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 93. Significantly, 
Cutler and his colleagues found that 46% of whites surveyed in 1990 refused to live in a 
neighborhood that is half black. See Cutler et al., supra note 5, at 490. Given the fact that 
blacks make up significantly less than 50% of the population of the United States, it would 
obviously be impossible for all communities to reach the racial composition sought by 
blacks. 
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2. Shortcomings · of Schelling's Tipping ModeL - While Schelling's 
model provides an explanation for the observed phenomenon of dy­
namic resegregation, it suffers from three major flaws. First, the prefer­
ences in Schelling's model are absolute. Second, they are isolated. 
Third, they are immutable. 
Schelling's model hypothesizes that white homeowners who decide 
whether to leave or stay on the basis of an absolute preference. In the 
model, once a white homeowner finds herself in a neighborhood whose 
percentage of black homeowners exceeds her preference, she will exit 
the neighborhood. But, in reality, the white homeowner's choice is 
much more complex. She can only decide whether it is advantageous to 
leave or stay in reference to the cost of relocating and the value of her 
preference for a given level of integration. For example, let us suppose 
that homeowner Alice prefers to live in a neighborhood that is 20% 
black. In Schelling's model, when the percentage of black owners 
reaches 21%,  Alice will leave immediately. But Alice's exit is not friction­
less. If Alice's exit cost is $1,000, while her loss from the fact that her 
racial preference was exceeded is only $100, she will choose to remain. If 
enough homeowners are similarly situated to Alice, the dynamic segrega­
tion can be arrested and a stable integration equilibrium may result. 
Second, Schelling's preferences are isolated in that the choices of 
white homeowners in racially changing neighborhoods are exogenous. 
But Alice's decision as to whether to stay or leave is largely strategic. 
Since Al ice knows that other homeowners may sell their houses, further 
changing the racial composition of the neighborhood, her decision to 
stay or leave necessarily depends upon her prediction of her neighbors' 
behavior. Suppose, for example, that Alice's loss from exceeding her ra­
cial composition preference of 20% is $1 ,500. If Alice believes that the 
neighborhood will inevitably become 100% black, then even if the neigh­
borhood has become only 1 %  black, she will sell immediately.92 She 
need not wait for the neighborhood to reach 21% black before she is 
"tipped" out. In other words, Alice decides whether to stay or leave not at 
the point in time posited by Schelling-the moment the percentage of 
blacks exceeds 20%-but rather at the much earlier time when Alice 
predicts that more than 20% of her white neighbors will choose to leave. 
Third, the preferences of white homeowners in Schelling's model 
are predetermined and immutable. He assigns to each owner a prefer­
ence for a given racial composition at the outset, and this preference 
does not change thereafter. However, studies show that people's prefer-
92. There may be instances in which Alice will decide to remain for reasons unrelated 
to the impending resegregation , such as the lack of available alternative housing. 
Nevertheless, aside from the marginal benefit of briefly el'\ioying an optimal racial mix on 
the way to resegregation, there is l ittle reason for Alice to wait for her *tipping point� to be 
reached once it is clear that resegregation is inevitable. 
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ences shift over time in response to changes in external circumstances.98 
For example, it is possible that at the outset, when the neighborhood is 
100% white, Beth prefers to live in a 5% black neighborhood. However, 
after living for some time next to a black neighbor, Beth may learn to 
adjust her preference to a 20% black neighborhood. This phenomenon 
is widely known in the literature as the production of "adaptive 
preferences. "94 
As a result of these shortcomings, Schelling's model leads one to be­
lieve that dynamic resegregation is unavoidable. Schelling's game-theo­
retic presentation suggests the rush of lemmings towards a cliff. In partic­
ular, it presents integration as a desirable yet unattainable goal. We 
challenge both Schelling's characterization and his ultimate conclusion.  
B. An Alternative Game-Theoretic Model of Dynamic Segregation 
The shortcomings of Schelling's model are best illustrated through 
the prism of game theory. In this section, we show that Schelling's model 
can be transformed into three different game matrices depending on the 
relative values white homeowners ascribe to their integration preferences. 
This exposition demonstrates that Schelling's tipping model need not 
lead to resegregation, as Schelling predicts, but rather that it may lead to 
stably integrated neighborhoods depending on the values of the 
parameters. 
To demonstrate the shortcomings of Schelling's model, we present 
three different game models of the process of black entry, leading to 
three different outcomes. First, we present a model in which white reac­
tion to black entry leads to a dominant strategy of resegregation as pre­
dicted by Schelling's basic model. Second, we present a model in which 
black entry leads to an assurance game, in which there is no dominant 
strategy, and, as a result, the neighborhood may become either inte­
grated or resegregated. Finally, we present a third model in which white 
reaction leads to an intermediate separating equilibrium in which the 
neighbOrhood becomes stably integrated. This three-game model 
presents a far more accurate description of reality than does Schelling's 
single model in that it explains why some neighborhoods remain stably 
integrated,95 while others rush over the cliff of resegregation. Although 
our model is admittedly simplified, i t  represents the basic choice struc­
ture faced by homeowners in neighborhoods experiencing racial tumo-
93. See Ow R Sunstein, Democracy and Shifting Preferences, in The Idea of 
Democracy (David Copp et al. eds., 1993) . See al:so McEntire, supra note 30, at 275-76 
(noting how changes in racial attitudes can result from integration). 
94. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1 129, 1 146-48 ( 1986} (describing adaptive preferences as those resulting from a 
good's inavailability) . 
95. For examples of stably integrated neighborhoods, see Sander, The Problem of 
Fair Housing, supra note 5, at 898 nn. 1 99-203 (listing and discussing examples of 
successfully integrated neighborhoods}. 
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ver: the choice between leaving and staying based upon one's expecta­
tion regarding her neighbors' choices. Furthermore, our model captures 
the central concerns of a homeowner in a potentially resegregating 
neighborhood: homeowners' preferences, the intensity of those prefer­
ences, and relative property values. We further address concerns about 
the adequacy of our stylized model in Part V of this Artide.96 
All three of our models are designed around the same basic story. 
Extending Schelling's framework of analysis, we posit a neighborhood 
consisting of three houses, initially owned by three white homeowners­
Alice, Beth, and Carol. As in Schelling's model, this simplified neighbor-
96. While we use numerical examples in this section to illustrate the three basic games 
in our model, these three games, in addition to a fourth game-the strong integration 
game discussed in Part IV-provide a good proxy for the set of all possible outcomes. That 
is, in any given case, one of the four games will produce a reasonable analogue for any 
given choice of numbers. This may be seen by examining a matrix in which we do not 
know anything about the players' preferences and payoffs. Consider the following matrix, 
where payoffs are represented by variables whose value we cannot determine. For 
convenience, we have also included quadrant numbers ( I-IV) above the payoff variables in 
each cell in the matrix. 
TABLE 1: GENERAL PAYOFF MATRIX 
Carol 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
s Le tay ave 
IV 1 
Wa. We Xa, Xc 
Ill II 
Ya. Vc zs, %c 
W'ithout knowing the value of any of the payoffs, we can see that the game can have only 
four outcomes: rwo players staying (quadrant IV) ,  which we call the strong integration 
game in our model; two players leaving (quadrant ll) ,  which we call the resegregation 
game; one player leaving and one player staying (quadrants I and III) , which we call the 
weak. integration game; and combination outcomes (any combination of multiple quad· 
rants), where both leaving and staying, in some combination, are equilibrium outcomes, a 
situation that we represent with the a.ssurancf' game, Of coune, the usurance game is a 
particular kind of combination outcome (quadrants IV and ll), but it represents the basic 
outcome of integration or resegregation occurring as a result of perceptions of the other 
player's likely choice. 
More generally, in any game of n players, there will be 211n cells, of which only one will 
involve all players staying (the strong integration game) and another one will involve all 
players leaving (the resegregation game) .  The other 2An-2 cells will involve some number 
of between I and n-1 players leaving while the rest stay (the weak integration game).  A 
total of 2"'2"-n-21\n-1 combination outcomes are also possible (the assurance game) .  
The result o f  the game will depend i n  all cases-whether there are n players o r  simply 
two players-on the players' payoffs, which, in tum, will rely upon the shapes of the play­
ers' preference curves. Our model does not rely upon and does not posit anything about 
the shape of those preference curves, and we have not attempted to gather empirical data 
about the mixture of individual preference curves to b� found in any given neighborhood. 
The foregoing discussion relies upon the simplifying assumption that games have a 
"winning" outcome whose quality is uniform. By treating outcomes as essentially alike, we 
ignore the important distinctions between different types of winning outcomes, such as the 
differences between strongly and weakly dominant strategies. The changes to our model 
that would be introduced by such complexities are beyond the scope of this note. 
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hood allows us to examine the choices of a homeowner who looks only to 
her right and to her left-that is, to the two houses abutting her own. In 
our model, all three of the white homeowners favor integration (to vary� 
ing degrees) .  One of the three white homeowners, Alice, sells her home 
to a black purchaser. This makes the racial composition of the neighbor­
hood 33% black and 67% white. The remaining two white homeowners, 
Beth and Carol, must now choose whether to remain in the neighbor­
hood or to sell their homes and leave. 
We model the decisionmaking process of Beth and Carol in the 
three two-player games below. In each model, we vary the assumptions 
regarding the subjective value the two homeowners attach to their inte­
gration preferences.97 
1 .  Resegregation Game. - In this first model, we presume that Beth 
prefers to live in a neighborhood that is 33% black, but that Carol prefers 
a neighborhood that is only 25% black (or any other percentage smaller 
than 33%).  However, Beth's preferences are more elastic than Carol's. 
That means that while Carol is mildly discomfited by each incremental 
divergence from her optimal integration preference, Beth's reaction is 
far more extreme. 
Beth assigns a value of $ 100 to her continued residence in her home, 
so long as the current level of integration remains. Carol attaches less 
value to her continued residence in her current home, since her optimal 
level of integration has been exceeded. She assigns a value of $85 to 
remaining in her current home, and a higher value of $90 to relocating 
to a new predominantly white neighborhood.98 Beth assigns a value of 
only $70 to the option of relocating to a new predominantly white neigh­
borhood, reflecting her more extremely gradated integration prefer­
ences.99 Finally, Beth assigns the even lower value of $60 to remaining in 
her home, should the neighborhood become 67% black. Should Beth 
leave while Carol remains, Carol would assign a higher value of $80 to 
living in a 67% black neighborhood, since her preferences are less gra­
dated than Beth's. 
The payoff matrix for this game is as follows: 
97. For simplicity's sake, we ignore concerns of liquidity in all of the games. We also 
ignore the possibility that a departing owner will sell the property to a white owner with 
divergent integration preferences. 
98. Carol does not assign a value of $ 100 to the option of moving for two reasons. 
Fint, she incurs transaction costs in selling her home and purchasing another. Second, 
living in a predominandy white neighborhood also fails to correspond to her integration 
preference. 
99. The lower value of this option also reflects the transaction costs in selling her 
home and purchasing another. 
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' • TABLE 2: REsEGREGATION GAME 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L tay eave 
100, 85 60, 90 
70, 80 70, 90 
[Vol. 100: 1965 
In this game, Beth has no dominant strategy. H Beth believes that 
Carol will leave, Beth will also choose to leave; if Beth believes that Carol 
will decide to stay, Beth will elect to stay. Carol, on the other hand, has a 
dominant strategy. No matter what Beth decides to do, Carol will decide 
to leave: Leaving guarantees Carol both the highest absolute payoff and 
the highest average payoff. Thus, the Nash equilibrium for this game is 
for both horneowners to sell their homes.100 The result is the one pre­
dicted by Schelling: resegregation of the neighborhood. 
2. Assurance Game: Segregation or Integration. - In this model, we as­
sume that Beth and Carol now have the same preferences for integration 
at a level of 33% black. Both also have the same intensity in their prefer­
ences. Thus, both Beth and Carol assign a value of $100 to remaining in 
a 33% black neighborhood, but a value of only $60 to remaining in a 67% 
black neighborhood. Finally, both assign a value of $90 to moving to a 
different, predominantly white neighborhood. 
The payoff matrix for this game is as follows: 
TABLE 3: AssURANCE GAME 
Carol 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
S L tay eave 
100, 1 00 60, 90 
90, 60 90, 90 
In this game, there are two Nash equilibria: both players staying and 
both players leaving. For both Beth and Carol, then, the decision to stay 
or leave is largely strategic. If Beth thinks that Carol is likely to leave, she 
too will decide to leave; if Carol thinks Beth wiJI stay, Carol will stay as 
well. In this game, the outcome depends entirely on the parties' percep­
tion of the others' likely move. Thus, it is possible for either stable inte­
gration or resegregation to result. This game is known in the literature as 
an assurance game. lo• 
1 00. This kind of game is  known as the Boxed Pigs game. See Eric Rasmusen, Games 
and Information: ,-\n Introduction to Game Theory 22-25 (2d ed. 1 994) . This game 
differs from a classic prisoners' dilemma game in that only one of the players in this game 
has a dominant slr.ttcgy. In a classic prisoners' dilemma game, both players have a 
dominant strategy. 
1 0 1 .  Assurance games are also known as Ranked Coordination games. Assurance 
games are characterized by a payoff structure in which ( 1 )  it is always better for the actors 
to make the same choice (A,A or B,B) than to make dissimilar ch oices (A,B or B,A); and 
(2) while both players would be better served by a certain choice (A,A over B,B) . that 
choice is not the players' dominant strategy. 'While A,A is Pareto optimal, and therefore 
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3. Weak Integration Game.l02 - In the last model, we alter the as­
sumptions of the previous game slighdy. Beth is slighdy less extreme ·in 
her opposition to living in a 67% black neighborhood and she assigns a 
value of $80 to this outcome. Otherwise the assumptions remain the 
same. 
The payoff matrix for this game is as follows: 
TABLE 4: WEAK INTEGRATION GAME 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
s Le tay ave 
100, 85 80, 90 
70· 80 70, 90 
In this game, Carol retains her dominant strategy of leaving. How­
ever, due to the change in values, Beth now has a dominant strategy as 
well; irrespective of Carol's decision, Beth will decide io stay. This game 
thus has a dominant equilibrium outcome, meaning a single Nash equi­
librium. Carol will leave and Beth will stay, meaning that the neighbor­
hood will become stably integrated at 67% black. 
4. The Effect of Dropping Property Values. - Finally, we must take note 
of the effect of changing property values on property owners' choices. 
Schelling's model predicts resegregation irrespective of changes in prop­
erty values. In fact, Schelling's model omits reference to prices alto­
gether. But, as we have seen, once prices are included in the model, 
resegregation is not the necessary result in the factual scenario predicted 
by Schelling. Consequently, changes in property values must be taken 
into account in predicting homeowner responses. 
We demonstrate here that while declines in property values do not 
change the outcomes of the resegregation and assurance games, they may 
change the outcome of the integration game. Specifically, declines in 
property values may transform the integration game into a resegregation 
game. 
Returning to our hypothetical three-house neighborhood, let us pre­
sume that the utility of staying in the neighborhood drops by $10 for each 
33% increase in black ownership. This drop reflects the decreased prop­
erty values. For purposes of the game, we will assume that if both home­
owners sell simultaneously, they split the loss for the next anticipated 
33% change i n  racial makeup.ws 
preferable to B,B, both A,A and B,B are Nash equilibria. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 
1 1, at 391-99. 
102. We label this game the "weak� integration game in contrast with the later 
"strong" integration game in which the dominant strategy for both players is to stay. See 
infra Part IV.C. 
103. For simplicity's sake, we assume that if both players decide to leave, they will 
share equally in the Joss associated with the disutility produced by resegregation. Since the 
values reflect the players' ex ante estimations of their actions' likely payoffs, it is irrelevant 
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a. The &segregation Game. - For the resegregation game, we use the 
same assumptions as in the previous resegregation game, and incorporate 
the expected property loss values. 
Using these assumptions, the new payoff matrix becomes as follows: 
TABLE 5: REsEGREGATION GAME, MoDIFIED To REFLEcr $10 EXPECfED 
Loss IN PROPERTY VALUE 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L eave tay 
90, 75 40, 80 
60 60 55, 75 
The change in housing values does not change the players' strate­
gies. Once again, Carol's dominant strategy is to leave, while Beth lacks a 
dominant strategy and would prefer to follow Carol. The result, once 
again, is resegregation. 
Even if the change in values is more drastic, $30 rather than $10, the 
result is the same and neither player's strategy changes. 
TABLE 6: REsEGREGATION GAME, MoDIFIED TO REFLEcr $30 ExPECTED 
Loss IN PROPERTY VALUE 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L eave tay 
70, 55 0, 60 
40, 20 40, 60 
Indeed, we may generalize and say that in this game no reduction in 
value of any size can alter the players' strategy. 104 
b. Tlu! Assurance Game. - In the assurance game, the playoff matrix 
becomes as follows: 
TABLE 7: AssuRANcE GAME, MoDIFIED TO REFLEcr $10 ExPEcrED Loss 
IN PROPERTY VALUE 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L tay eave 
90, 90 40, 80 
80, 40 75, 75 
As in the case of the resegregation game, the change in values does 
not change the players' su·ategies. Neither Beth nor Carol has a domi-
that sales are unlikely to be simultaneow, so long as it is equally likely that one player or 
the other will make the fint sale. 
I 04. Given the baseline values we have assigned, changes in property values will 
change the playen' strategies only if there is an increase in values of sufficient magnitude. 
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nant strategy, and, once again, there are two stable equilibria: for both to 
stay and for both to leave. 
Also, as in the case of the resegregation game, even a more drastic 
reduction in property values fails to alter the underlying strategies. 
TABLE 8: AssuRANCE GAME, MoDIFIED To REFLECT $30 ExPECTED Loss 
IN P�OPER1Y vALUE 
&th Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L tav eave 
70, 70 0, 60 
60, 0 45, 45 
Indeed, as in the case of the resegregation game, no reduction in 
property values of any size can change the players' strategies. •os 
c. The Weak Integration Game. - In the weak integration game, the 
playoff matrix changes to the following: 
TABLE 9: WEAK INTEGRATION GAME, MoDIFIED TO REFLECT $10 
EXPECTED Loss IN PROPERlY VALUE 
&th Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L tay eave 
90, 75 60, 80 
60, 60 55, 75 
Here, again, the players' strategies fail to change. Carol's dominant 
strategy is to leave, while Beth 's is to stay, resulting in an equilibrium of 
stable integration. 
However, if the drop in values is more drastic, the game will become 
like the resegregation game above, with an equilibrium result of both 
players leaving. 
TABLE 10: WEAK INTEGRATION GAME, MODIFIED TO REFLECT $30 
EXPECTED Loss IN PROPER'IY VALUE 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
S L eave tay 
70, 55 20, 60 
40 20 25, 45 
Due to the reduction in property values, Beth now prefers to leave in 
the event that Carol leaves, so she no longer has a dominant strategy of 
staying. Carol's dominant strategy does not change; she will leave regard­
less. The game's equilibrium outcome, then, is for both players to leave. 
105. However, an increase in property values can alter the players' strategies. 
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Here,  too, we may generalize the result. A small change in property 
values will not change the game's outcome, but a sufficiently large reduc­
tion in property values will change the game into a resegregation game. 
The results of our analysis may be summarized as follows. First, black 
entry into predominantly white neighborhoods sets in motion a process 
that may lead to resegregation or to integration. The process may be 
mapped in three game-theoretic models-the resegregation game, the 
assurance game, and the weak integration game. Second, the particular 
game form that the process will take depends on white homeowners' inte­
gration preferences and their relative intensity, as well as changes in 
property values. Third, perceived declines in property values of sufficient 
magnitude drive white homeowners away from weak integration models, 
and accelerate the movement toward resegregation of racially changing 
neighborhoods. Fourth, and finally, perceptions (even inaccurate ones) 
are crucial in determining how white homeowners will respond to racial 
change. The likelihood that a white homeowner will abandon a racially 
changing neighborhood is dramatically enhanced by a perception that 
property values will decline or that one's white neighbors will leave the 
neighborhood. 
Having described the choice structures of white homeowners in ra­
cially changing neighborhoods, we now tum to an analysis of the choice 
structures of shareholders facing tender offers. The choice structure of 
shareholders facing tender offers in the market for corporate control 
closely resembles that of homeowners in neighborhoods facing dynamic 
segregation. The choice structure in both cases is subject to similar dis­
tortions, a factor leading shareholders and homeowners individually and 
collectively to make decisions that run counter to their individual and 
collective self-interest. Thus, in analyzing the market for corporate con­
trol, we focus on the solutions that have been developed for rectifying 
distorted choice structures. 
III. THE �iARKF.T FOR CoRPORA:n:: CoNTRoL AS A MouEL FOR THE 
HOUSING MARKET 
A. The Coercive Effects of Tender Offers 
We begin our analysis of the similarities between the housing and 
corporate control markets by introducing the tender offer. The tender 
offer has been the most common technique for taking control of a corpo­
ration in the last several decades.106 In a tender offer, the would-be ac­
quiror ( less complimentarily known as a .. raider") issues an offer to 
purchase shares from shareholders in the target corporation. The tender 
offer-the means by which the raider makes the offer-specifies a price 
that the raider will pay to any shareholder who tenders (i.e., offers) her 
shares for sale. The purpose of the tender offer is to enable the raider to 
1 06. See Thomasj. Andr�.Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in 
the Market for Corporate Con trol, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 533, 535 ( 1 990). 
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obtain a majority of shares in the target corporation,• and thereby to gain 
control over the target. Usually the tender offer contains a limitation 
specifying that the tenders will only be accepted by the raider if the raider 
is successful in receiving enough tenders to acquire majority control. If 
the raider fails to achieve majority control by the deadline specified in 
the tender offer, the tender offer ends, and the raider does not buy any 
of the tendered shares. 
Tender offers can come in several variations. In a partial tender of­
fer, the raider proposes to purchase only a portion of the shares of the 
target corporation at a specified price. For example, a raider rnay issue a 
tender offer for 51% of outstanding shares in the target corporation. 
The raider can then take majority control of the corporation with these 
shares, while leaving the remai.riirig· 49% of sha,res to others in the 
market. 
· · 
A popular variation of this is the two-tier, front-loaded tender offer. 
This tender offer specifies a first, higher price for the first "tier,.,.. or front 
end, and a second, lower price for the second "tier," or back end. How­
ever, the tender offer specifies that only a certain portion of the shares on 
the market will be able to be tendered in the front tier. For example, a 
raider, R, inte rested in acquiring target corporation, T, might issue a 
tender offer containing the folloWing terms. The raider will pay $80 per 
share for the first 5 1 %  of shares tendered to the raider. 107 This is the 
front end or first tier. Remaining shareholders will be paid in newly is­
sued securities worth $50 per share.108 This is the . back end or second 
tier. A technique called the "freezeout" or "takeout" allows the raider to 
force nontendering shareholders to accept the back-end price. In a 
freezeout, the raider forces minority shareholders to exchange their 
shares for an inferior class of shares. 109 
An "any-and-all tender offer," by contrast, specifies only a single price 
to be paid to all shareholders who tender by the specified date, without 
1 07. Law or the corporate charter or rules may aUocate decisionmaking power in a 
number of ways, not all of them requiring majority rule. The laws or charter may also 
specify different levels of control for different decisions. However, the basic point is the 
same, irrespective of the precise number of shares necessary for control to make particular 
decisions. 
l OR See, e g. ,  Unoml C-orp. \1. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949-50 (Del. 1 985) 
(involYing two-tier tender offer where the second tier consisted of subordinated junk� 
bonds) .  
109. In a freezeout, R. the new owner of the target corporation T ,  merges T into 
another of R's corporations. Because T ceases to exist, shares in T no longer represent a 
share of ownership, and R must compensate T's shareholders. R compensates these 
shareholders by giving them securities of lesser value in the new post-merger corporation. 
The minority shareholders are thus "frozen out" of their ownership in T. For a discussion 
of the problems of valuation in a freezeout, see John C. Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an 
Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 1 47 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1 251 ( 1999). 
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limitation on the number of shareholders who may tender. 1 10 However, 
the any-and-all tender offer contains an implicit back end as well, since, 
after the closing date of the tender offer, the acquiror can execute a 
freezeout and thereby force minority shareholders to "sell" their shares at 
a lower, back-end price. 
Bebchuk oudined the coercive effects of tender offers in a series of 
articles in the 1980s. 1 1 1  The tender offer, Bebchuk noted, forces the 
shareholder either to tender her shares at the front-end price specified in 
the offer, or to risk parting with the shares at the back-end price if the 
takeover succeeds. So long as the front-end price is higher than the back� 
end price-and it always is-a shareholder who believes that a tender 
offer will succeed is best advised to tender her shares according to the 
terms of the tender offer. l12 
Empirical studies indeed verify that the front-end share price sped� 
fied in tender offers generally exceeds the market price both prior to the 
announcement of the proposed takeover and subsequent to its successful 
completion. 1 1 5  That is, the front-end price is usually the best price availa-
1 10. See, for example, Pantry Pride's offer in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, 506 A2d 1 73, 1 7 7  (Del. 1985).  
1 1 1 . See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed 
Remedy, 12  Del.]. Corp. L. 911, 9 1 1  ( 1987) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender] ; 
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 1 6, at 1 696; Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 
1039-41 (1982) . Numerous others have noted these coercive effects as well. See, e.g., 
Edward F. Greene & james J. Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers 
and Acquisitions, 1 32 U. Pa. L Rev. 647, 679 (1984) (� [B]y paying a significantly higher 
cash price per share in the first-step, partial tender offer than in the second-step merger, 
bidders may pressure shareholders to tender hastily or risk forever losing the higher 'front­
end' price.") ; Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Sdentific Evidence, 1 1  J. Fin. Econ. 5, 31 ( 1983) ("Acting independently, each 
shareholder maximizes his wealth by tendering, although all target shareholders are better 
off if nobody tenders . . . .  ") ; Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: 
A Proposal for Legislation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 254 (198!) ("Th� right of shareholders 
to elect whether or not to sell-and especially at what price to sell-may be largely 
illusory."); Elliott J. Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's 
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1 087, 1 1 02 ( 1982) (discussing Williams 
Act effort to protect vulnerable shareholders from �tender offers designed to force them to 
decide quickly whether to sell") .  
1 1 2. For this Article, we  have assumed that the relevant actors are not wiDing to 
ell!fdge in extrajudicial activity. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, and there will 
certainly be cases of vandalism or even violence when blacks first enter some white 
neighborhoods. While recognizing the problems of violence and vigilantism, this Article 
focuses. on the more s.ubtle hann of reKgregation. 
1 1 3. See Bebchuk, Pressure to Tender, supra note I l l (discussing SEC study finding 
lower post-takeover value of minority shares) ; Da\-id W. Leebron, Games Corporation!� 
Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 53, 1 86 n . l 1 6  ( 1 986) (discussing 
congressional studies showing that tender offers were generally 15% higher than market 
value) ;  see also J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward, Takeover Premiums, Appraisal 
Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Finn's Publicly Traded Stock, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 783, 796-98 
( 1991 ) (suggesting that competitive takeover market requires bidders to make high front· 
end offers) . 
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ble for a share, unless another suitor presents a superior offer. Thus, 
even if a shareholder believes that the "true" value of the share is greater 
than the front-end price, she will tender her shares, so long as she be­
lieves that the tender offer is likely to succeed. As several commentators 
have noted, the tender offer places shareholders in the familiar position 
of players in a prisoners' dilemma.1 14 
To return to the earlier example, suppose that �hares in target cor· 
poration T sell at $65 prior to a tender offer. Rose, a potential raider, 
issues a tender offer for shares in T at $80 per share in the front end, with 
a contemplated back end of $40 per share. Any shareholder who believes 
that the tender offer will succeed will therefore tender her shares at $80, 
lest she be caught in the back end. 
These coercive effects can be expressed in gam�theoretic fashion. 
Let us assume that there are only three shareholders--Rose, Sally, and 
Theresa-with each holding on�third of the shares of the corporation. 
Rose issues her tender offer for $80 for one share (which will give her 
control of two.thirds of the shares) with a contemplated back-end price of 
$40 for the other share. If Sally and Theresa both tender, the front-end 
price will be apportioned among their shares, and each will end up with a 
blended price of $60. If only one tenders, the tendering shareholder will 
receive the front-end price of $80 and the nontendering shareholder will 
receive the back-end price of $40. Finally, if neither shareholder tenders, 
the tender offer will fail and shares will retain their previous value of $65. 
The payoff matrix for the game is as follows: 
1 14. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Pressure To Tender, supra note I l l ,  at 922-25 (illustrating 
how shareholders' tender decisions may be distorted due to the prisoners' dilemma) ;John 
C. Coffee, Jr. &: William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of Constrained 
Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 207, 1 224-33 
(1991)  ( demonstrating how corporations use exchange offers to place shareholders in a 
prisoners' dilemma) ; jeffrey N. Cordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and 
the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L Rev. 3, 42-60 ( 1988) (discussing the 
likelihood that shareholders will face collective action problems that permit managers to 
make wealth-reducing recapitalizations); Robert A Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two­
Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty 
Offensive Weapon, .!l9 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 389, 439-44 ( 1989) (arguing that fron t-loaded 
two-tier tender offers, a type of prisoners' dilemma, have a coercive effect on 
shareholders). 
There is much dispute about the reason why front-end prices should be higher than 
badt-end or pre-tender-offer prices. In such instances, the raider believes that the shares 
are undenlalued at market price. This may be because she believes that the market price 
does not sufficiently reflect the available information concerning the target corporation 's 
prospects for future earnings. Alternatively, it may be because she believes that if she is 
able to take control of the corporation, she will be able to introduce superior management 
or synergy, and thereby improve the target corporation's profitability. Another possibility 
is that the raider may intend to use control of the corporation to divert illicit corporate 
profits away from the corporation (and, thereby, away from the minority owners) to 
herself. For our purposes, the motives of the raider are irrelevanL It  is important only to 
note that the price differential between the front-end and back-end prices pressures 
shareholders to tender. 
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TABLE 1 1 : Two-TIER TENDER OFFER 
Sally Don't  tender 
Tender 
Theresa 
Don't  tender 
65, 65 
80, 40 
Tender 
40, 80 
60, 60 
The dominant strategy in the game is for both parties to tender, al­
though the players would be better off collectively were they to abstain 
from tendering. Without the possibility of coordinated action, each 
player will prefer the payoff of tendering (80 or 60 instead of 65 or 40, 
respectively) .  
The end result i s  that the structure of the tender offer drives share­
holders to tender their shares, even if the terms of the tender offer are 
inadequate. 1 1 5 
B. Responses to Shareholder Coercion 
The coercive effects of tender offers have prompted legal regulation 
and private defensive tactics of all manner and variety. The most exten­
sive regulation is found in the Williams Act of 1 968, which was expressly 
designed to rein in the coercive aspects of tender offers.1 16  Subsequent 
legislation in various states has added further legal limitations on tender 
offers. 1 17 The takeover boom of the 1980s, together with creative lawyer­
ing, produced a set of private defensive techniques utilized by firms seek­
ing to ward off unwanted tender offers.1 1 8  This section briefly examines 
these regulations and defensive techniques with an eye toward adopting 
the techniques for use in the housing market. We must add two impor­
tant caveats. First, a complete survey of these regulations and techniques 
is beyond the scope of this Article; indeed, only a book-length work could 
provide an adequate summary. Our look at the regulations and tech­
niques is deliberately abbreviated to focus on those items of concern to 
1 15.  Even opponents of regulation of tender offers tend to agree on the ability of 
lender offers to pressure shareholders into decisions that may be to their disadvantage. 
However, opponents of regulation view the "coercive� effects as salubrious. They see the 
ability to exclude shareholders from the full financial benefit of the takeover as necessary 
to promote the proper functioning of the market by creating the possibility of profit for a 
successful takeover that replaces suboptimal managemen t. See Ronald J Gilson, A 
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 8 19, 875 ( 1981) . 
1 1 6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-78m(f) , 78n(d) -78n (f) ( 1 994). The Walliams Act was an 
amendment to the Securities Exchange Acl of 1 934. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 
U.S. 1 ,  26-37 ( 1977) ( discussing the legislative history of the Williams Act) . 
1 1 7. See Luciau Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The 
Race to Protect Managers From Takeovers, 99 Colum. L Rev. 1 1 68, 1 1 77-9 1 ( 1999) ; john 
H. Matheson & Brent A Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward 
Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1 425, 1 438-55 ( 1991 ) .  
1 1 8. For a recent overview o f  defensive techniques, s e e  john H. Matheson, Corporate 
Governance at the Millenium: The Decline of the Poison Pill Antitakeover Defense, 22 
Ham line L. Rev. 703, 71 8-33 ( 1999) . 
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our analogy. Second, we do not concern ourselves here with the efficacy 
or desirability of the various regulations and techniques in the stock mar­
ket. Indeed, many believe that the various regulations and techniques 
harm market efficiency, and that the pressure to tender should generally 
be viewed as benign.1 19 But, irrespective of whether the regulations and 
techniques help make the market for corporate control more efficient, 
there is little doubt that such techniques do alter the choice structures of 
the relevant participants in that market. Therefore, we describe the 
structure and goals of the regulations or techniques in general terms, 
with an eye toward adapting their effects on the choice structures of mar­
ket participants in the market for corporate control to participants in the 
housing market. 
Collectively, the defensive measures and regulations can be grouped 
into four categories-regulations of time, information, substance, and 
coordination. 
Regulations of time include such basic provisions as the SEC's twenty­
day rule.l20 The rule, promulgated under the authority of the Williams 
Act, 121 requires that most tender offers be held open for at least twenty 
days. Prior to the Williams Act, raiders would induce panic among share­
holders by issuing tender offers with offer periods of only several days. 
The "Saturday Night Special," for example, would be issued on a Friday 
with a closing period of the following Monday, requiring shareholders to 
decide whether to tender over the weekend. 122 Many of the defensive 
1 1 9. See supra note 1 1 5  (explaining possible harms and benefits of tender offers). 
While there is a great deal of dispute about the extent to which tender offers should be 
regulated, there is near-universal agreement that at least some regulations are aimed at 
helping entrench management rather than protecting shareholders from undesirable 
coercion. Even Bebchuk has agreed that 
[s] tates' relentless efforts to come up with new anti takeover statutes seems [sic] to 
be motivated by a desire to make takeovers more difficult rather than by an 
attempt to address in a cost-effective way l!Ome valid policy concerns. And the 
latitude that states have afforded the use of defensive tactics ha<� suma<�.,t'd what 
even the strongest supporters of defensive tactics have advocated. • 
Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 1 1 7, at I 1 7 1 .  
1 20. 1 7  C.F.R. § 240. 1 4e- 1 (a) (2000) .  Modern defensive techniques focus on 
coordination, but our survey is designed to elucidate historical methods that affect the 
question of choice structure, even i f  such methods are no longer in fashion. See Andrf, 
supra note 1 06, at 535-36 ("The principal objective of the latest generation of defenses is 
to convert the tender offer process from one emphasizing the exercise of individual 
shareholder choice . , into one requiring the approval of either the target'! board of 
directors or the stockholders acting collectively:). 
1 2 1 .  WiUiams Act § 2, 15 U .S.C. § 78m(d) ( 1 994) .  
1 22. For a discussion of the history of the Williams Act. see William C. Tyson ,  The 
Proper Relationshi p  Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 24 1 ,  249--64 ( 1 990); see also supra note 1 1 6  and accompanying text. 
As one commentator notes: 
It was a super offensive weapon, the �saturday Night Special," that helped prompt 
the initial state and federal regulation of tender offers . . . .  The "Saturday Night 
Special" helped ensure the success of a hostile bid . . . .  [by] timing [ ) the 
announcement [to] preven t[ ) any effective response from target 
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measures undertaken by target corporations are also designed to extend 
the amount of time during which the takeover takes place in order to 
reduce coercive pressure on shareholders. These time-related measures 
fall in a larger family of securities regulations designed to reduce pan­
icked responses by shareholders by expanding the time horizon of deci­
sionmaking. Examples of such regulations include "circuit breaker" cool­
ing-off periods in the stock market following sharp declines in share 
prices.t2s 
Regulations of information seek to eliminate market distortions caused 
by incomplete or inaccurate information. The most important regulation 
in this regard is the Williams Act's bar on spreading misinformation and 
its prohibition of other fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative prac­
tices.124 Other regulations impose disclosure requirements on stock pur­
chasers, such as the 5% rule, which requires a filing with the SEC in the 
event that one acquires sufficient stock for one's holdings to meet or ex­
ceed 5% of outstanding stock in the corporation. 125 
Naturally, though, regulations and defensive tactics of the substance 
of the tender offer have provided the most extensive and varied counter­
measures for the coercive pressures of tender offers. Countermeasures 
provided for by law have generally been aimed at ensuring the "fairness" 
of the tender offer by ensuring equality of treatment for shareholders. A 
typical example of this kind of measure is the "appraisal right" which al­
lows minority shareholders to demand an appraisal to determine the fair­
ness of the compensation they receive in a freezeouL 126 The appraisal 
determines whether minority shareholders have received back-end com­
pensation that accurately represents the value of the minority shares they 
are surrendering. 
Corporate defensive countermeasures are more wide-ranging and in­
clude several varieties. One type of technique, often called shark repel· 
lent, aims at reducing the attractiveness of the corporation as a target by 
taking on large amounts of debt or otherwise bringing to the corporate 
management . . . . Target shareholders, who were often given little or no 
information about the offeror or its financing, made their decisions . . .  (with) a 
gun ( ] at their collective head. 
Prentice, supra note 1 14, at 39 1 .  
1 23. See supra note 22. 
1 24. 1 5  U.S.C. § 78n (e). 
1 25. The Schedule 1 3D filing, triggered by 5% ownership, requires disclosure, inter 
alia, of the acquiror's purpose in acquiring the shares and her plans regarding the target. 
See 1 5  U.S.C. § 78m(d) ( 1 ) .  
1 26. Other measures include "best price" requirements that all tendering shares be 
eligible for the best price specified in the tender offer (with a pro-rata division in the event 
that too many shareholders tender) and wall holdersw rules which require that tender offers 
present the same terms to all shareholders (essentially eliminating the possibility of two-tier 
offers) . See Matheson &: Olson, supra note 1 1 7, at 1438-55. 
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profile features that are considered unattractive to potential raiders or 
"shark.s."127 
Another device, the "poison pill," is actually not a single technique at 
all. There are numerous variations of the poison pill, ostensibly aimed at 
protecting shareholder rights and designed to discourage unwanted 
tender offers on several different bases.128 Some variations of the poison 
pill, loosely called "flip-in" plans, seek to dilute the ownership interest of 
the would-be acquiror in order to render the takeover technique ineffec­
tual. For example, the target corporation may issue convertible nontrans­
ferable, nonvoting stock to its current shareholders. However, upon a 
triggering event, such as the acquisition of more than 20% of the stock of 
the corporation by a single purchaser, the convertible stock becomes or­
dinary voting stock. 129 The controlling interest represented by each 
share is thereby diluted, making acquisition more difficulL 
Another type of poison pill-the type of greatest interest to us in this 
Article-seeks to alter the relative attractiveness of tendering in the front 
end by offering compensation to shareholders who tender in the back 
end. For example, a "flip-over" poison pill may offer nontransferable, 
nonvoting stock to shareholders that, as in the previous example, lies dor­
mant until a triggering event. Upon a takeover and freezeout, however, 
the stock's flip-over provisions take effect. As we noted earlier, in a 
freezeout, the raider merges the target into another of the acquiror's 
companies and forces minority shareholders in the target to exchange 
their shares for an inferior class of securities in the newly merged corpo­
ration. The flip-over provision allows bearers of the nonvoting shares 
(the nontendering minority shareholders) to exchange them for more 
valuable shares in the new corporation.180 If the flip-over provisions are 
sufficiently robust, nontendering shareholders receive back-end compen­
sation that is superior, rather than inferior, to the front-end price re­
ceived by tendering shareholders. This reversal of the attractiveness of 
the two types of compensations--the back end becoming preferable to 
the front end-neutra1izes the coercive effects of the tender offer. 
A particularly striking example of the technique of reversing the at­
tractiveness of front- and back-end compensation was provided by Unocal 
in 1985. Responding to a proposed takeover by raider T. Boone Pickens 
at $54 per share, Unocal offered to buy back-end shares at $72, with the 
stock repurchase to be financed by a large debt issue. The enormous 
debt burden incurred by Unocal served as shark repellent, deterring the 
1 27. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: 
Strucrural Umitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 Sran. L. Rev. 775, 780-89 ( 1982).  
128. For a recent review of the poison pill's various incarnations and its place in 
corporate governance, see Matheson, supra note 1 18. 
1 29. See Paoickj. Thompson, Note, Shareholder Rights Plans: Shields or Gavels?, 42 
Vand. L. Rev. 1 73, 184-85, 1 85 n.92 ( 1989) . 
1 30. For an example of a flip-over plan, see Moran v. Household lnt'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 
1059, 1065-66 (Del. Ch. 1985) .  
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purchase, while the repurchase plan served as an incentive to remain in 
the back end, thus deterring the tender of shares to the raider. tlU 
Some severe forms of state regulation have gone beyond the poison 
pill and practically seek to outlaw hostile takeovers altogether. Business 
combination statutes, for example, bar most mergers between target cor­
porations and "interested" shareholders absent approval by the board of 
directors. 132 These statutes, like the poison pills adopted by corpora­
tions, cannot completely prevent hostile takeovers, but they do change 
the focus of raiders' efforts. In order to complete a takeover, the raider 
must enlist the board of directors' support, and if the board is not willing 
to grant such support, the raider must seek to replace the directors them­
selves. Often, this is accomplished through a proxy fight, in which the 
raider attempts to convince shareholders to vote to replace directors with 
candidates of the raider's choice. 133 
Some have suggested a different kind of regulation altogether-reg­
ulations of coordination-aimed at increasing coordination among 
shareholders in order to allow them to respond to the advances of a 
raider the way a corporation owned by a single individual would. 134 
Given the unfortunate history of restrictive covenants, we do not see this 
avenue as a promising source for techniques in the housing markets. 
Aside from th e special case of coordination, the techniques and reg­
ulations we have described, along with numerous others, aim at one es­
sential goal: altering the incentives operating on the various parties to 
the transaction in order to discourage some types of tender offers. In the 
next section, we propose adapting these techniques to alter the incentives 
operating in the housing market in order to discourage resegregation. 
There are, of course, some important differences between the market for 
corporate control and the housing market in racially changing mar­
kets.135 Nevertheless, the stock market techniques that were devised to 
UH .  See 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2539 n.45 ( 1986); Fred R. Bleakley, Pickens to 
End Bid for Unocal, N.Y. Times, May 21 ,  1985, at 01 (noting failure of Pickens's Bid) ;  
Robert J .  Cole, New Tactic as Unocal Hils Back, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1 7, 1 985, at D 1  
(explaining that effectiveness of Unocal's poison pill comes from large amount of new 
debt) ;  Hartley Defied Pickens in Struggle for Unocal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at D2 
(describing Unocal case) . The facts are well summarized in Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
951 F.2d 1 5 1 2, 1 513-15  (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) .  Eventually, Unocal carried out a stock repurchase 
not conditioned on the success of Pickens's tender offer. See generally Unocal Corp. v. 
Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 , 1 083 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (denying preliminary injunction to 
enjoin Unocal from completing a self-tender offer} . 
1 32.  See, e.g., Ca. Code Ann. § 1 4-2-1 132(a) ( 1 )  ( 1994) (requiring approval of 
corporation's board of directors prior to a business combination) .  
1 33. See Andrt, supra note 106, at 536-38; M:ardn M .  Cohen, Not�!, �Poil•nn Pill:�" a.� a 
Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover Wars, 1 987 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 459, 509. 
1 34 .  See, e.g., Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice, supra note 16, at 1 701 (�What 
the undistorted choice objective suggests is that we should enable a target's dispersed 
shareholders to act as a sole owner would be likely to act.") . 
1 35. See infra Part V.B. 
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neutralize the shareholders' fear of being left at the back end, as well as 
other market distortions, provide a fertile ground for cultivating tech­
niques for combatting dynamic resegregation. 
IV. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE LAw OF CoRPORATE ACQUISITIONS TO 
l>vNAMIC SEGREGATION 
In this Part, we attempt to draw on the techn iques used to correct 
distortions in the market for corporate control to craft solutions for diS­
tortions i n  the housing market. Although the distortions in the two mar­
kets are not identical, the analogy can nevertheless prove extremely use­
ful in crafting solutions for the distortions in homeowners' choice 
structures. Drawing on the solutions crafted in the context of tender of­
fers, we suggest the use of four major techniques: equity insurance, taxa­
tion of real-estate transactions, institutional subsidies, and growth con­
trols. We also consider and reject the use of several other techniques. 
At the outset, we must add a cautionary note. The 'use of each of our 
proposed techniques must be finely tuned in light of our goal: not to 
stop the process of black entry into white neighborhoods, but rather to 
eliminate the panic accompanying black entry by neutralizing the eco­
nomic incentive for whites to leave racially changing neighborhoods. In­
deed, in light of pervasive segregation in American housing markets to­
day, the consequence of complete stability in racial turnover of 
neighborhood populations would be the institutionalization of racial seg­
regation-the exact opposite of the result we seek. Thus, in presenting 
each of the techniques, we address this concern and suggest how we can 
avoid the perverse result of augmenting existing segregation. 
The list of techniques that we presen t  is not meant to be either ex­
haustive or exclusive. These techniques can be used alone or in combina­
tion with one another or with other techniques that others may suggest. 
The purpose of our analysis is to introduce some sample techniques. 
These techniques take advantage of the analysis of strategic choice that 
we presented in Part II of this Article and draw on the analogy of the 
distorted choice present in the market for corporate control, as discussed 
in Part III. 
A. Equity Insurance 
Of the various techniques we present in this Part, equity insurance is 
the only one that has been deliberately and systematically employed to 
counter white flightY'6 A standard equity insurance scheme allows 
1 36. Equity insurance is also known as equity assurance. See Maureen A McNamara, 
Comment, The Legality and Efficacy of Homeowner's Equity Assurance: A Study of Oak 
Park 111inois, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 463, 1 470-72 ( 1 984) (describing the Oak Park "equity 
assurance" program ) .  For an example of an equity insurance statute, see, e.g., Home 
Equity Assurance Act, 65 Ill. Comp. StaL Ann. 95/ 1-20 (West 1 993) (codifying an equity 
insurance program for Chicago). Oak Park and Alsip, IDinois have adopted equity 
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homeowners to purchase insurance against declines in the values of their 
homes.137 This insurance is intended to assure white homeowners that 
they will not suffer substantial losses from declining property values 
caused by changes in the racial makeup of their neighborhood.138 Insur­
ance schemes of this type have been employed in several communities in 
the state of lllinois.u9 
Insufficient empirical evidence currently exists as to the effectiveness 
of home-equity insurance plans. Ho In some neighborhoods, stable inte-
insurance plans. See, e.g., Village Home-equity Program Amended, Chi. Trib., jan. 5, 
1989, at 3C (reporting that Aslip has amended its equity insurance program to simplify 
settlement of appraisal disputes) . Equity insurance bas also been used in Chicago's 
Southwest Side and in Baltimore's Patterson Park neighborhood, and Syracuse is now 
considering adopting an equity insurance plan. See Jonathan Eig, Mixed Results: How 
Fear of Integration Turned White Enclave Into a Melting Pot, Wall St.J., Aug. 7, 2000, at 
AI. 
Equity insurance may have wider applications beyond the integration context. See 
William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on 
Robert Nelson's "Privatizing the Neighborhood," 7 Ceo. Mason L Rev. 881 ,  886-89 ( 1 999) 
(discussing equity insurance as a means for reducing local opposition to projects wi th  local 
negative externalities). This may potentially be important in demonstrating lack of racial 
motive for constitutional purposes. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional 
implications of our analysis, see infra Part V .A. 
137. Typically, home equity insurance plans guarantee the insured the value of her 
house as appraised at the time she joins the plan. See McNamara, supra note 1 36, at 1 466. 
However, the Oak Park equity insurance plan begins to provide protection " [f] ive years 
after the village issues a certificate of participation to the homeowner." ld. at 1 468. 
1 38. For example, the Oak Park program reimburses the homeowner for only 80% of 
her loss. See id. This, in our opinion, considerably undermines the effectiveness of the 
program since homeowners may rationally select to avoid the program altogether and 
attempt to sell first. 
1 39. In 1988, the Illinois state legislature adopted a comprehensive home insurance 
plan. See 65 m. Comp. Stat. Ann. 95/1-20. The legislation allows Chicago homeowners to 
pay a tax of 1 2  cents for every $100 of assessed valuation. The revenues from the tax go to 
an insurance pool, which assures the homeowner the value of the house at the time she 
entered the program if she remains in the program for five or more years. 
140. For example, in the Southwest Side of Chicago, 10 years of equity insurance has 
slowed resegregation, but whether the neighborhood will ultimately remain integrated is 
an open question. See Eig, supra note 1 36. Interestingly, in the 10 yean that the program 
has been in place, only 10 owners have filed claims. See id. Similarly, in the first five years 
after the establishment of the Oak Park program, only 1 2 1  homeowners chose to enroll, 
with the vast rrugority of them joining in the first year. See McNamara, supra note 1 36, at 
1480. Oak Park officials interpreted the low enrollmem figure "as indicative of the overall 
success of its integration program." ld. The low number of payouts in the Southwest Side 
haJ� been similarly interpreted. This accords with our analysis, which predicts that the 
mere existence of equity insurance will alter homeowners' expected payoff suucture and 
encourage integration without the necessity of actually awarding a payment. 
The history of Kankakee, Illinois, differs significantly from that of Oak Park. In 
response to substantial racial changes, Kankakee considered but eventually rejected the 
possibility of adopting a homeowner equity insurance program. See id. at 1482-83. The 
main reason for this decision was the depressed economic outlook for the municipality. 
Kankakee simply could not afford to shoulder the cost of a city-wide insurance scheme. 
This is one example of a case showing how homeowner equity insurance programs may be 
impractical precisely in those municipalities where they are needed. 
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gration seems to have taken hold; in others, resegregation has not slowed 
significantly. 
The mixed success record of equity insurance programs accords with 
our model's predictions. The standard hom�quity insurance compen­
sates homeowners for the decline in their homes' values to the extent 
that the decline is disproportionate to that which may be occurring in 
other neighborhoods that are not experiencing a significant change in 
racial composition. As we noted above, a decline in expected property 
values is responsible for resegregation only in some cases. In others, 
resegregation results primarily from divergent integration preferences, ir­
respective of property values. Accordingly, our model predicts that 
home-equity insurance programs will arrest resegregation only in two 
cases. First, insurance can effectively impede resegregation in neighbor­
hoods in which most white homeowners would have elected integration 
but for the decline in real-estate prices. This is a case that was initially 
characterized by the payoff matrix of a weak integration game, but was 
transformed into a strong segregation game by a drop in real-estate value. 
By compensating homeowners for the reduction in property values, the 
insurance program reinstates the initial payoff matrix of the weak integra­
tion game. Second, insurance can prevent segregation in neighborhoods 
in which white homeowners are indifferent between leaving and stay­
ing-the underlying situation is an assurance game. In this case, insur­
ance can signal to other homeowners an intention on the part of the 
insurance buyer to stay in the neighborhood. 
Our model also predicts that home-equity insurance will fail to pro­
duce integration in the resegregation game that we outlined above. In 
that game, divergent preferences are enough to produce segregation. In­
deed, in that situation, only the prospect of a substantial gain associated 
with integration would transform the payoff matrix into that of an inte­
gration game.141 Existing insurance programs do not offer any such gain. 
Furthermore, insurance schemes will fail to produce integration if the 
underlying situation is one of an assurance game and other market sig· 
nals drown out the signaling effect of the insurance program. The mag-
1 4 1 .  If a gain of $go was associated with each gg% increase in black ownership in our 
three-house neighborhood posited earlier, the payoff matrix of the resegregation game 
example we posited in Part III would become as follows: 
TABu 12: R.Es!:cRECATION GAME, MoDIFIED TO REFLECT $30 ExPECTED GAIN IN 
PROPERTY V Al.UE 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Given the new values, Beth's dominant strategy would be to stay, while Carol would lack a 
dominant strategy (preferring to stay if Beth leaves, but otherwise preferring to leave) . 
The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Beth to stay and Carol to leave, producing stable 
i ntegration at a 67% black neighborhood. 
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nitude of the signal associated with insurance critically depends on the 
number of homeowners who decide to buy insurance. A strong enough 
signal will not be generated unless enough homeowners buy equity insur­
ance-the dominant strategy in an assurance game situation would then 
be to stay. 
Finally, we must note that insurance comes at a price, while the re­
sult it guarantees may be accomplished costlessly by selling as soon as 
black entry occurs.142 A large number of white homeowners may there­
fore elect not to buy the proposed equity insurance. For this reason, the 
availability of equity insurance may not produce integration even in the 
two cases in which it has the potential to do so. 
Both the promise and the limitations of equity insurance can be seen 
by comparing the program to its counterpart in the market for corporate 
control. Equity insurance can be compared to a limited appraisal 
right. 145 Equity insurance, like the appraisal right, does not guarantee 
the asset holder a front-end price. It only insures the asset holder against 
the risk of a certain type of loss-in our case, a disproportionate drop in 
price relative to the purchase price or to price declines in other neigh­
borhoods. However, equity insurance falls short of the appraisal right in 
two important respects. First, whereas the law extends appraisal rights to 
all shareholders, home-equity insurance only benefits those who elect to 
purchase the insurance.144 Second, in many cases existing equity insur­
ance programs guarantee only the purchase price, not the full value of 
the asset. Nevertheless, properly implemented equity insurance can 
mimic the achievements of appraisal rights by limiting the exaggeration 
of certain distortions and, perhaps, by slowing the development of panic. 
Two final difficulties with the widespread use of equity insurance 
must be mentioned. First, equity insurance can have undesirable distrib­
utive effects. The insurance fund pays the claims of those homeowners 
who sell their houses in the face of a racially changing neighborhood. 
Indeed, equity insurance, like many types of poison pills in the takeover 
142. In addition, cosdes.s exit, while hopeful segregationists may assume it exists, may 
not be possible. It would be possible if there were a sufficient supply of buyers willing to 
pay the (new) market price for housing, and who would not perceive the "panic sale" effect 
and attempt to engage sellers in a bidding war. To the extent that buyers perceive the 
need for rapid exit, they will offer lower prices. Thus, the potential for sale may not be an 
acceptable substitute for adequate insurance. On the flip side, insurance might entail its 
own administrative costs, and would depend on the solubility of the insurer. However, on 
balance, it seems evident that insur.mce is the superior solution . 
1 43. The appraisal right allows minority shareholders, forced to surrender their 
$hares in a freezeout, to have the value of their shares "appraised" to make sure their back­
end compensation is adequate. There is no guarantee that the back-end c::ompen!llltion 
will be as large as the front-end compensation. See supra notes 1 17 &: 1 26 and 
accompanying text. 
1 44. Of course, all homeowners could be required to purchase equity insurance. 
However, mandating the purchase of home equity insurance would come at a considerable 
price. Since it is very difficult to predict which neighborhoods will undergo rapid racial 
changes, it is impracticable to limit the scope of the scheme to certain neighborhoods. 
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context, is designed not to pay out; it is intended, rather, to alter the 
choice structure of potential sellers. Thus, the first candidates for pay­
ment will be those homeowners who have the least toleration for integra­
tion-the pure segregationists and those who will only tolerate a very 
small amount of integration. In this respect, the higher the amount of 
equity insurance awarded, the larger the payoff to the most bigot�d. 145 
Second, state sponsorship of a home-equity insurance plan associated 
with "protecting" realty values against the "risk" of racial integration 
threatens to reinforce the very negative racial stereotypes that we seek to 
eliminate. 146 This objection has led to intense opposition to the use of 
equity insurance in some quarters. 
For all these reasons, equity i nsurance is a less-than-ideal remedy to 
the problem of dynamic resegregation. It addresses only a limited subset 
of the choice structures that lead to resegregation and even in those cases 
it cannot be deemed a panacea. Nevertheless, like appraisal rights in the 
context of tender offers, equity insurance can provide an essential, 
though not sufficient, tool in combatting distortions of choice. 
B. Taxes on Home Sales 
A second way of adjusting the relative values of staying and leaving is 
the imposition of taxes on realty sales in neighborhoods with high turno­
ver of real estate (a "sales tax") . 147 In imposing this ·sales tax, policymak­
ers should be cautious not to deter black entry altogether. Thus, we pro­
pose that the first 5% of the sales in every year should be tax-free and that 
all remaining transactions should be taxed substantially. The effect of 
this tax scheme would be to raise exit costs for all but the initial 5% of 
white homeowners who wished to sell. The combination of a tax-free set 
of transactions with a subsequent steep tax regime creates a mechanism 
akin to a "cooling-off'' period. A neighborhood in which home sales have 
become "overheated" is placed in a tax regime designed to postpone 
most remaining sales to the subsequent year. The availability of the op-
145. Theoretically, there is no reason why equity insurance should be restricted to 
compensating for decreases in value of the property. The insurance plan could be crafted 
to ensure that all homeowners would be guaranteed a certain minimum rerum on their 
realty investment. If the payment were sufficiently large, the equity �insurance" could serve 
not only as a proxy appraisal right, but also as a proxy flip-in plan. For further discussion 
of how $UCh plans would work, see supra notes 1 28- 1 30 and accompanying text. Of 
cou rse, the higher payment.s would increase the moral difficulty of rewarding 
segregationists for their intolerance. 
146. For a critical review of the implications of home equity insurance, see Ankur J. 
Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority IntereslS: An Anti-Subjugation Theory For 
Equality in Housing, 22 Urb. Law. ·!69, 399 ( 1990) (arguing, inter alia, that in tegrative 
measures such as home equity insurance may stigmatize blacks). 
1 47. Imposing this tax only in neighborhoods experiencing high racial turnover is, no 
doubt, the most efficiem way to impose the tax. Nevertheless, basing the tax on racial 
turnover, as opposed to general turnover, might raise constitutional difficulties. See 
discussion in Part V.A. 
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tion to pay the tax and exit the neighborhood avoids unnecessary restric· 
tions on homeowners' property rights. Additionally, as noted above, the 
homeowners most likely to pay the steep tax are those who value segrega­
tion most highly, while those most likely to avoid the steep tax burden are 
those most favorable to integration. Moreover, the tax money collected 
may be used to subsidize community institutions in racially integrated 
neighborhoods, as we will describe in the subsequent section. 
It is possible that the five percent exemption per year would allow all 
segregationists to depart over the course of three or four years without 
paying the sales tax. 148 This, however, is not a grave concern for us since 
our primary goal is to accomplish stable integration, and the goal of "pe­
nalizing" segregationists is merely secondary. If we were to eliminate the 
five percent exemption, we might end up barring black entry into segre­
gated neighborhoods altogether, which would be a far worse result. For 
the integrationist homeowners, on the other hand, the imposition of the 
sales tax serves several important functions. First, by creating a cooling­
off period, the sales tax deters panic sales in response to black entry. Sec­
ond, by making exit more expensive, the tax reduces the incentive to 
leave the neighborhood. In this sense, the tax seJVes as the distant cousin 
of the "shark repellent" in the market for corporate control: It adds a 
substantial financial burden to any acquisition of a house outside the 
neighborhood, and thereby reduces the attractiveness of exercising that 
option. 
A sufficiently large tax will convince all but the most committed seg­
regationists to avoid selling their homes, at least until the next tax-free 
sale period.149 Nevertheless, since the tax only deters sales during the 
period when it is in force, the tax will not permanently alter the players' 
payoff matrices. A sales tax will only change the long-term equilibrium 
outcome of the assurance game in which the combination of the cooling­
off period and the increased cost of leaving will lead both players to stay 
in the neighborhood. 
The use of a sales tax to combat resegregation also has notable unde· 
sirable side effects. The imposition of the proposed tax will have a chit-
148. This depends, of course, on the number of segregationists in every 
neighborhood, and the need of integrationists to leave the neighborhood for reasons 
unrelated to race. 
1 49. For example, a tax that added $15 to the price of leaving the neighborhood in 
our earlier resegregation game would convince both players to avoid selling during the 
period of the tax, as illustrated in the following payoff matrix: 
TABLE 1 3: REsECR..EGATION GAME, MooJF!Eo TO REnEcr $1 5 EXIT Cosr IN FoRM or .-. 
Beth S1:ay 
Leave 
SALES TAX 
The dominant strategy in this game is for both players to stay. 
2000] THE INTEGRATION GAME 201 1 
ling effect on voluntary market transactions that may be the result of such 
benign factors as a new job or a change in family circumstances. The 
increased cost of exit itself distorts the choice strategies of homeowners, 
and it prevents the consummation of mutually beneficial transactions 
that would have occurred in the absence of this tax. This problem is even 
more acute if the sales tax is universally applied across all neighborhoods. 
· One could attempt to limit the negative effects of the sales tax by restrict­
ing its application to specific neighborhoods in danger of resegregation. 
Identifying such neighborhoods, however, is not a straightforward task, 
and applying the tax on a case-by<ase basis could prove politically 
challenging. 
Notwithstanding these considerable difficulties, the sales tax should 
be considered as one of the few means of introducing a time-related rem­
edy to the distortions of choice that take place in situations of dynamic 
resegregation. 
C. lnstiJ:utional Su.bsidies 
Our third proposed technique is less problematic and more far­
reaching than equity insurance. We propose direct subsidization of com­
munity institutions in neighborhoods under threat of dynamic resegrega­
tion. 150 Specifically, we propose creating a federal fund that will subsi­
dize parks, schools, 15 1 community centers, and basic infrastructure. The 
subsidies will be triggered by a certain level of turnover in realty owner­
ship or by a certain level of neighborhood integration. After a general 
discussion of the efficacy of subsidies, we present two possible triggering 
mechanisms and a possible source for financing the fund. 
Subsidizing community institutions adds value to homes in the 
neighborhood and increases the attractiveness of remaining at the back 
end. In this way, we imitate the effects of flip-over plans and other poison 
pills that raise the back-end price and compensate nontendering share­
holders. Additionally, subsidizing community institutions creates positive 
signaling effects and rewards those homeowners who choose to remain in 
an integrated neighborhood, rather than those who opt for an alternative 
150. We are not the first to propose the idea of using subsidies to improve racial 
relationships. For example, Ronald Silverman proposed that subsidies be used to open 
communities up to low-income residents. See Ronald H. Silverman, Subsidizing Tolerance 
for Open Communities, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 375, 377. Although the focal poim of our 
analysis is race and not income, to the extent that race and income are correlated (and 
indeed they are) our proposal and Silverman's proposal arc not qualitatively diMimilar. 
Yet, our game-theoretic framework alters the magnitude of the subsidies necessary to 
accomplish integration. This can best be seen in the context of the assurance game. While 
Silverman uses subsidies as prizes to reward tolerant communities, we use them to create 
and amplify signals to white homeowners about the potential of the neighborhood to 
remain stably integrated. 
1 5 1 .  See, e.g . •  Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 653 (1983) 
(arguing that making schools in racially changing communities more appealing to whites 
may help encourage and preserve stable racial integration). 
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home in a segregated community. Finally, since segregationists are ex­
cluded from its benefits, subsidization of community institutions avoids 
some of the moral difficulties of equity insurance. 
The positive effects of subsidies can be seen in all three of the games 
that characterize neighborhoods undergoing racial change. We tum first 
to the resegregation game, which was characterized by Beth's highly gra­
dated integration preferences. To recap, the three-home neighborhood, 
two-player game posited that Beth assigned a value of $100 to her contin­
ued residence in her home at the current level of integration, but a value 
of only $60 to remaining in the event that black ownership should reach 
a level of 67%. Carol assigned a value of $85 to remaining in her home at 
the current  level of integration, and $80 should black ownership reach 
67%. Beth assigned a value of $70 and Carol $90 to the option of relocat­
ing to a new predominantly white neighborhood. If each homeowner is 
given a subsidy worth $15152 to remain, the following payoff matrix 
results: 
TABLE 14: RESEGREGATION GAME, MODIFlED TO REFLECT $ 1 5  OF 
CoMMUNITY SuBSIDIES 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
Stay Leave 
1 15, 100 75, 90 
70, 95 70, 90 
The addition of the subsidies alters the strategies of the two players. 
While Carol 's dominant strategy in the pre-subsidies game was to leave, 
her dominant strategy now is to stay. And while Beth lacked a dominant 
strategy in the pre-subsidies game, her dominant strategy now is to stay as 
well . Thus, the addition of sufficiently large subsidies turns the resegre­
gation game into a strong integration game, in which the strongly domi­
nating strategy, and the equilibrium result, is for both players to stay. 153 
For similar reasons, the addition of subsidies alters the weak in tegra­
tion game into a game with a strong integration payoff matrix, as follows: 
1 52. The numbers in our models are intended for illustrative purposes only; studies 
have shown lhat even small improvements can produce significant increases in realty 
values. See Andrew J. Gold, The Trinit.y Initiative in Economic Pet'!lpective; Place or 
People Prosperity?, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 1 31 7, 1 337-38 ( 1998) (citing Arthur O'Sullivan, 
Urban Economics 367-68, lbl . 1 4 1  (3d ed. 1996) ) (refening to a St. Louis study according 
to which minor improvements in the exterior appearance of adjacent buildings increased 
sale value by five percent). 
1 53. If the subsidies are too small, the payoffs may be changed without altering the 
players' strategies, or, alternatively, the game may be changed into one akin to an 
assurance game in which tht!re are two equilibrium outcomes-both players leaving or 
both players staying. 
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TABLE 15: WEAK INTEGRAnON GAME, MODIFIED TO REFLECT $15 OF 
CoMMUNriY SUBSIDIES 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
s Le tay ave 
115, 100 95, 90 
70, 95 70, 90 
Again, the strongly dominant strategy for both Beth and Carol is to 
stay in the neighborhood. 154 
Only in the case of the assurance game do the players' strategies re­
main intact. Adding the $15 subsidy produces the following payoff 
matrix: 
TABLE 16: AssURANCE GAME, MODIFIED TO REFLECT $15 OF 
CoMMUNriY SUBSIDIES 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
Sta Le lY ave 
1 15, 1 1 5  75, 90 
90, 75 90, 90 
This remains an assurance game; there are two equilibrium solu­
tions-one in which both players stay and one in which both leave. The 
visible results of the subsidies, however, should produce dear signals of a 
commitment to retain the neighborhood's current integrated 
population. 155 
Moreover, if the size of the subsidy is sufficiently increased, the assur­
ance game can also become a strong integration game. For instance, if 
the subsidy is increased to $35, the payoff matrix would become as 
follows: 
TABLE 17: AssuRANCE GAME, MoDIFIED TO REFLECT $35 OF 
COMMUNfiY SUBSIDIES 
Beth Stay 
Leave 
Carol 
s Le tay ave 
135, 135 95, 90 
90, 95 90, 90 
In this instance, both players' strongly dominan t strategy would be to 
remain. 
154. Once again, the subsidies must be sufficientJy large. In this instance, if subsidies 
are too small, the players' strategies will remain in a weak integration game, or, 
alternatively, the indifference of Carol to integration will be replaced by a weak dominant 
strategy of staying. 
155. But see infra Part V.D (noting the potential objection that this and other 
remedies would only treat the symptoms of the problem, allowing racism to continue to 
exist) . 
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Empirical evidence confirms the insights of our model. A recent 
study of white flight in Boston during the 1950s determined that resegre­
gation took place in those neighborhoods in which religious institutions 
depended primarily on local support. In neighborhoods in which relig­
ious institutions were able to rely on external subsidies-primarily Catho­
lic churches that obtained funding from their archdiocese-resegrega­
tion was retarded or even arrested.l56 
If improperly administered, subsidies for community institutions may 
be too powerful a remedy. H all homeowners are so highly compensated 
that they do not want to leave the neighborhood, no black purchasers will 
be able to enter the neighborhood, and the fund for community institu­
tions will end up subsidizing the maintenance of segregation. One way to 
avoid this unfortunate irony is to calibrate the triggering mechanism for 
the subsidies to make them available only to neighborhoods that are al­
ready sufficiently integrated. The most obvious way to achieve this goal is 
by making the subsidies available only to communities with a black popu­
lation of between 20% and 50%.157 Unfortunately, a triggering mecha­
nism that explicitly relies upon racial percentages may be constitutionally 
problematic, as we discuss in the next Part. H '8 A less controversial way to 
trigger the subsidies would be to make them available any time a neigh­
borhood experiences a turnover of a given percentage of its housing 
stock within a specified time period-for example, 20% within four years. 
As the subsidies would be available only after the requisite number of 
sales, one would hope that black entry into the neighborhood had al­
ready become sufficiently established to create an acceptable degree of 
integration. The magnitude of the subsidies should also be tailored to 
avoid creating too high an incentive for homeowners to stay in their 
homes. Like a too-potent poison pill, exaggeratedly large subsidies can 
deter even desirable transfers of control over the assets. Adjusting the 
subsidies to the proper level will therefore require continuous monitor· 
ing of neighborhood turnover. 
Unlike equity insurance, the fund for subsidized community institu­
tions is designed to disburse funds rather than merely to deter realty 
transactions. Consequently, a funding mechanism for the subsidies is of 
1 56. See Gerald Gamm, Urban Exodus: Why the Jews Left Boston and the Catholics 
Stayed 263-73 ( 1999) .  Gam m 's study notes that other factors, such as stronger territorial 
attitudes among Cathoiics, also contributed to the disparity. See id. at 1 5-16, 237, 259-00. 
See generally Hillel Levine & Lawrence Harmon, The Death of an American Jewish 
Community: A Tragedy of Good Intentions passim ( 1 992) (detailing gradual flight of jeWll 
from Boston). Subsidies are currently being used on an ad·hoc basis in several 
communities throughout the United States, but we know of no comprehensive study of 
current subsidy methods or their efficacy. See, e.g., Repps Hudson, Cities Scramble to 
Manage Boom and Decline, St. Louis Post·Dispatch, Feb. 25, 1998, at AI (discussing 
stabilization methods used by St. Louis suburbs) .  
1 57. This range reflects the expressed preferences o f  whites for 20% integration and 
of blacks for 50%. See Massey & Denton, American Apartheid, supra note 2, at 93. 
1 58. See infra Part V.A 
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critical importance. One way of raising the necessary capital is to impose 
a tax on home sales as outlined in the previous section. 159 
D. Growth Control Measures 
Our proposal to utilize growth controls to combat dynamic resegre­
gation may seem, at first blush, counterintuitive. Growth controls on the 
local level are often attacked as exclusionary measures,160 designed to bar 
the entry of minorities and indigents into the community.161 In its 
larldmark Mount Laurel decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court even 
ruled that exclusionary zoning practices may violate constitutionally guar­
anteed equality rights.162 Nevertheless, we show that regional growth 
controls-as opposed to local growth controls-can have salutary effects 
on the housing market in periods of racial change. While growth con­
trols may serve an exclusionary function when applied in small towns and 
individual suburbs, paradoxically, they can serve the opposite function 
when applied in large metropolitan areas. 
The growth controls we propose do not seek to restrict the number 
of available residential units in the controlled area. Rather, they are in­
tended to limit the development of new suburbs, thereby restricting the 
potential for resegregation. Admittedly, even our intended use will re­
strict housing supply at the margin. In contrast with traditional growth 
control, which aims to control the supply of all housing, our aim is to 
restrict the supply of segregated housing. Growth controls discourage 
resegregation by imposing the cost of undesired density on homeowners 
fleeing neighborhoods undergoing racial changes. 
Consider the following example. Assume that the city of Metropolis 
has four neighborhoods, each with an equal population of residents. 
One neighborhood is entirely populated by blacks, while the other three 
are entirely populated by whites. Assume now that a single black person 
moves into one of the white neighborhoods and that the white homeown­
ers in that neighborhood find themselves in one of the two games leading 
to resegregation-the segregation game or the assurance game. If there 
are no growth controls, the fleeing white homeo-wners can develop new 
suburban neighborhoods at will, and by creating a new suburban neigh-
159. Another possibility is adopting unused premiums from an equity insurance 
program, <U has been done in Chicago's Southwest Side. See Eig, supra note 1 36, at Al . 
1 60. See, e.g., Richard Briffau!t. Our Localism: Part 1-The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1 ,  58 ( 1990) (positing that local growth-control 
measures often reinforce �the class and cultural differences that drive communities apart 
and breed interlocal suspicion, tension and conflict") ;  Roben C. Ellick.wn, Suburban 
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale LJ. :585, 400 ( 1977) 
("Antigrowth measures have one premier class of beneficiaries: Those who already own 
residential structures in the municipality doing the excluding."). 
161. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, 
Equal Protection, and the Indigent. 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969) (considering the 
application of the "new equal protection" doctrine to "exclusionary zoning") . 
162. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, S36 A.2d 71S (NJ. 1975) .  
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borhood, the whites are able to move into a neighborhood with a density 
equal to that of the neighborhood they left. This result is shown in the 
table below. 
TABLE 1 8: NEIGHBORHOOD PoPULATION REDisTRIBUTION 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
City #1 City #2 City #3 City #4 Suburban #1 
PoPULATION 
Initial distribution 
Mter resegregation 
10 blacks 
5 blacks 
10 whites 
5 blacks 
1 0  whites 10 whites 0 
10  whites 10  whites 10 whites 
However, if growth controls are in place, whites can only relocate at 
the expense of greater density, as shown in the table below. 
TABLE 1 9: NEIGHBORHOOD PoPULATION REmsrRIBUTION, MoDIFIED BY 
GROWTH CONTROLS 
POPULATION 
Initial distribution 
After resegregation 
City #1 
10 blacks 
5 blacks 
NEIGHBORHOOD 
City #2 City #3 City #4 
10 whites 10 whites 10 whites 
5 blacks 15 whites 15 whites 
This additional density places an extra cost on the option of leaving, 
which can be viewed as an exit cost or exit tax. l 63 
The effect of this exit tax resembles that of the tax we discussed 
above.164 Depending on the magnitude of the tax (that is, depending on 
the degree to which homeowners dislike dense housing arrangements) , 
the additional cost may change resegregation games into integration 
games. 1 6� Because the mechanism of growth control is indirect, however, 
it is unlikely to send the sort of signal that would alter the outcome of an 
assurance game. 
The growth controls we propose have an additional effect similar to 
that of a "pac-man defense" in the market for corporate control. Like the 
pac-man defense, growth controls can change the dynamic of the market 
by reversing the roles of buyers and sellers. The pac-man defense in the 
market for corporate control transforms the raiders into targets. Growth 
controls in the housing market can similarly induce whites (the sellers in 
1 63. A comprehensive development plan that imposes growth controls on a large 
metropolitan area exists in Portland, Oregon. While the scheme enacted in Portland was 
not primatily intended to address the issue of integration, the scheme may produce data 
regarding racial integration that can be used to test our model. For studies of the Portland 
experience, see generally Gerrit Knaap & Arthur C. Nelson, The Regulated Landscape: 
Lessons on State Land Use Planning from Oregon ( 1992) (describing and analyzing the 
Oregon land use program and offering policy insights) .  
164. See supra Part IV.B. 
1 65. See supra note 149. 
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the resegregation context) to buy realty in black neighborhoods. The key 
to this effect, once again, is density. To the extent that resegregation 
causes greater density in segregated white neighborhoods, it creates an 
incentive for whites to seek housing in the less densely populated black 
neighborhoods. 
E. Supplementary Measures and Issues of Preferences 
The four techniques examined so far in this Part do not exhaust the 
list of mechanisms that can be adapted from the analogous market for 
corporate control. Indeed, our analysis explains the importance of many 
techniques implemented to date and raises some cautionary flags regard­
ing government intervention in the housing market. For example, it ex­
plains the importance of prohibitions in the Fair Housing Act of certain 
real-estate broker practices such as the bar on inducement to sell based 
on "representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the 
neighborhood of . . .  persons of a particular race . . . . "166 Like the gen­
eral antifraud provisions of the Williams Act, 1 67 the limitations on bro­
kers' representations prevent the creation of market "noise" that could 
lead to panic selling and accelerate white flight.168 Brokers in the realty 
market, like brokers in the stock market, profit from the number of trans­
actions they handle. Thus, they face a strong incentive to "churn" their 
clients' accounts, or to encourage their clients to engage in transactions 
that are not to the clients' benefit. 1 69 Our formal game presentation 
demonstrates that, in some situations, white homeowners' expectations of 
future price changes, or of their neighbors' decisions, are themselves the 
trigger for those changes or decisions. 
Furthermore, our analysis identifies precautions to take in regulating 
the housing market. In the market for corporate control, defensive mea-
1 66. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) ( 1 994) .  
1 67_ Williams Act § 3(e) . 1 5  ll $,C. § 78n(e) ( 1994) .  
1 68. Interestingly, as previously noted, the Fair Housing Act prohibits all inducements 
based on representations regarding racial entry into the neighborhood, not merely 
fraudulent inducements. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) . 
1 69. The most notorious practice employed by real-estate brokers is widely known as 
�blockbusting." As one court described it: "Blockbusting is a practice whereby real-estate 
agents artificially stimulate sales of residential property by making representations to 
homeowners regarding the migration of a particular racial, ethnic, religious, or social 
group into t.�e neighborhood.w New York State Ass'n of Realtors v. Shaffer, 27 F.3d 834, 
835 (2d Cir. 1994).  At its prime in the early 1960s, this practice was responsible for a racial 
change of two or three blocks a week in Chicago, according to one reporL See Norris 
Vitcheck, Confessions of a Block-Buster, Saturday Evening Post, july 1 4, 1962, at 1 6. But cf. 
Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and Race-Based Real­
Estate Speculation, 67 Fordham L Rev. 1 1 45, 1 158-59 ( 1998) (documenting blockbusting 
and panic peddling in Chicago in the 1960s and early 1970s, but arguing that such 
practices no longer exist and that they are unlikely to return) .  Note that though 
blockbusting is probably no longer the force it once was, the demise of outright 
blockbusting does not seem to have significantly slowed the force of dynamic 
resegregation. 
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sures sometimes produce their own antidotes. For example, the develo� 
ment of poison pills during the 1980s has spurred a series of proxy fights. 
Rather than attempt to complete the acquisition under the shadow of the 
poison pill's tenns, potential acquirors in these proxy fights tried to influ­
ence shareholders to change the composition of the corporation's board 
of directors. They could then appoint directors who would cancel the 
poison pill. There is reason to expect that a similar dynamic may develop 
in regulating the housing market. Faced with local regulation designed 
to promote an integrated housing market, segregationists may attempt to 
capture local political organs to promote their agenda.17° Consequently, 
we recommend implementing our integrationist measures on the federal 
level.171 
We believe that utilizing the framework developed in this Artide 
would help identify other stock-market techniques that could be im­
ported to the housing market. Notwithstanding the differences between 
the markets and the assets traded in them, panic and coercion-driven 
sales in both markets are closely related. Thus, the more mature and 
well-developed stock market can provide fruitful guidance in combatting 
the distortions in the housing market that lead to resegregation. 
170. Scholars have noted the danger that legislatures will be captured by interest 
groups. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through 
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227-33 ( 1 986) 
(listing ideas of interest group theory, including the basic idea that M[i]nterest group 
theory treats statutes as commodities that are purchased by particular interest groups or 
coalitions of interest groups that outbid and outmaneuver competing interest groups"). 
Empirical evidence suggests that legislative capture may advance segregation. See Yale 
Rabin, The Roots ofSegregation in the Eigh ties: The Role of Local Government Action, in 
Divided Neighborhoods: Changing Patterns of Racial Segregation 208 (Gary A. Tobin ed., 
1987) (listing numerous examples of local municipalities abusing their power to promote 
segregationist preferences) . In fact, an increased presence of minorities may even 
heighten this effecL See Oscar Newman, Fair Housing; The Conflict Between Integration 
and Nondiscrimination, in Issues in Housing Discrimination, supra note 85, at 1 72, 195 
( 1 985) ( contending that, in New York, there is a correlation between increased black 
occupancy and decreased political support for public housing) . 
171 .  A caveat is in order here. Past experience indicates that federal h ousing agencies 
have often been extremely insensitive to the problem of segregated housing and have 
adopted policies that dramatically exacerbated the plight of various minorities. A case in 
point is the Fai r  Housing Agency's (FHA) mortgage-insurance program. For a tim(:, the 
program·, guidelines discouraged lenders from investing in areas with "inhannonioru 
racial groups" or neighborhoods undergoing social changes. Gary Orfield, Federal Policy, 
local Power, and Metropolitan Segregation, 89 PoL Sci. Q 777, 786 ( 1 974-1975) (quoting 
FHA Underwriting Manual) .  For a critical review of the role of the FHA in the 
preservation of inner-city ghettos and poverty in the past, see Michael H. Schill & Susan M. 
Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in 
Urban America, 1 43 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1285, 1290-1313 ( 1995) (describing how federal 
housing policies and mortgage-assistance programs have concentrated inner-city poverty 
and destabilized inner-city neighborhoods) . However, one can hope that federal agencies, 
including the FHA. will be far more sensitive now to the problem of racial housing 
segregation and will appreciate the crucial importance of the need to cure this problem. 
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v. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL 0BjECfiONS 
In this Part, we confront four sets of potential objections to our anal­
ysis. The first set revolves around the constitutionality of the measures we 
propose to counteract resegregation. The second involves doubts regard­
ing the limitations of the stock-market analogy and of the assumptions 
underlying our game-theoretic analysis. The thir!i set addresses the po­
tential perverse effects of the measures we propose and the threat that 
they will produce the opposite of the results we desire. The fourth and 
final set questions the efficacy of measures that do not directly confront 
racial bias. 
A Constitutional Issues 
Any legal venture into the area of race relations quickly runs into the 
muddled constitutional jurisprudence of affirmative action and racial dis­
crimination. In accordance with current Supreme Court doctrine, 
courts' employment of the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause172 in 
reviewing legislation may be summarized as a two-step process. In the 
first step, the court attempts to determine the type of classification em­
ployed by the relevant legislation. The type of classification controls the 
kind of scrutiny to be employed in the second step. For example, racial 
classifications generally trigger "strict scrutiny," but economic classifica­
tions generally lead only to "rational basis" review.l7S In the second step, 
the court applies the relevant level of scrutiny to the legislation and deter­
mines whether the law passes constitutional muster. 
The strict scrutiny applied to racial classifications has been described 
as ' "strict' in theory, fatal in fact."174 But the fatality of strict scrutiny is 
not so self-evident when applied to "benign" racial classifications, such as 
those used in affirmative-action measures. In City of Richmond v. ].A. 
Croson Co. I 75 and its successor Adarand Constructors, Tnt:. v. Pena, 176 the 
Supreme Court clarified that benign racial classifications would trigger 
strict scrutiny, even when employed by the federal govemment.I 77 In 
each case, however, members of the Court have suggested that the linger­
ing effects of racial discrimination could provide the compelling state in­
terest that would justify the sort of "narrowly-tailored" corrective mea-
1 72. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ,  cl. 2. 
1 73. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1 654, 1 658-59 (2d ed. 
1988) . 
1 74. Gerald A Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1 ,  8 ( 1 972) .  
1 75. 488 u.s. 469 ( 1989).  
1 76. 515 u.s. 200, 201 ( 1 995). 
177. In the aftermath of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), it is possible 
that the Enforcement Clause of the Founeenth Amendment will no longer provide a basis 
for permitting congressional action to escape strict-scrutiny review. 
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sures that would ·survive strict scrutiny. 1 78 The reach of this remedial 
power is far from clear. The Supreme Court is perceived to have evinced 
hostility toward affinnative-action measures in recent years, 179 and it 
might now strike down any measures in the housing market that explicitly 
use racial criteria. Lower court decisions evinced some confusion about 
the issue in pre-Croson and pre-Adarand decisions. 180 
It is for this reason that we eschew any explicit racial criteria in our 
proposals for rectifying resegregation. Any measures that directly re­
warded integrated neighborhoods or punished segregated neighbor­
hoods might founder on the shoals of the Rehnquist Coun's new Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. We propose a much safer route: to engage 
only in market regulations of market phenomena without resort to racial 
criteria. The Court's review of economic classifications in Equal Protec­
tion challenges is forgiving to the point of pennissiveness.181 This means 
that our remedies should pass constitutional muster so long as the first 
step of the examining court's Equal Protection analysis shows a nonracial 
classification. 
It is  true that courts may look beyond the explicit classifications em­
ployed by legislation to see whether a racially discriminatory motive 
should trigger strict scrutiny. 182 However, the evidence of racially dis­
criminatory motivation must be quite strong before the courts will invali­
date legislation that does not explicitly employ racial classifications. 183 
Thus, for example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
1 78. See Croson, 488 U.S. at  486-93 (O'Connor, ]., plurality opinion) ;  Adamnd, 5 1 5  
U.S. at 235-37 (O'Connor, )., opinion of the court, joined a t  this section by a plurality of 
four Justices). While O'Connor wrote for the Coun in Adarand in most respects, Justice 
Scalia added in a concurring opinion that he joined with the opinion only insofar as it  
concurred with his belief that �government can never have a 'compelling interest' in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in 
the opposite direction." Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
1 79. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Access To Justice: The Rehnquist Court of justice: 
An Oxymoron, Wash. U. J.L. &: Pol'y 37, 46 ( 1999) (arguing that "the Coun has been 
consistently hostile to cilrrent:ly existing suspect classifications when such involves 
affirmative action efforts"). 
1 80. Compare United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1 1 02 (2d Cir. 
1 988) (finding a program limiting black entry in order to achieve racial balance illegally 
discriminatory}, with Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1 122, 1 1 40 (2d Cir. 
1973) (finding a program limiting white exit from racially mixed neighborhood 
constitutional} .  
1 8 1 .  See, e.g., Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, 
Economics, and Public Policy 233 ( 1 994)  (4[G] overn ment actions broadly lumped into the 
category of 'economic and social' have been subjected to very little judicial attention."). 
The dall-'k example of this level of review is found in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. ,  348 
U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (holding that discrimination against opticians in favor of 
opthamologists and optometrists is constitutionally acceptable since the "law need not be 
in  every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutionan . 
182. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 265 ( 1 977) ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 ( 1976). 
1 83.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 2 1 7 ,  224-25 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
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Development Corp., the Court decided not to strike down the Chicago sub-­
urb of Arlington Heights's refusal to grant a zoning variance despite alle­
gations that the intent of the refusal was to block the entry of black fami­
lies.184 Our measures are designed to counter distortions in economic 
incentives in times of high turnover in the housing market, and might 
therefore be justified to the court on nonracial grounds.185 Additionally, 
it is not clear that even if the court discerned a "benign" racial motive, 
strict scrutiny would be triggered. Consequently, we expect that legisla­
tion to enact our measures would avoid being subjected to strict scrutiny 
as motivated by invidious racial discrimination. 
8. The Limitations of the Stock Market Analogy and Our Game-Theoretic 
Model 
1 .  The Usefulness of the Market for Corporate Control Analogy. - One 
might argue that the stock market is an imperfect analogy for the housing 
market. This objection consists of seven claims. 186 The first is that the 
aggregated assets of actors in the market for corporate control themselves 
are an important asset-the target corporation. In the market for corpo­
rate control, there are special qualities that inhere in majority control of 
the units (shares) being sold that do not obtain in the housing market. 
The aggregated assets of various homeowners-the neighborhood com­
prising their houses-are not and cannot be a single asset controlled by a 
184. 429 U.S. at 270. 
1 85. a. Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 481 U.S. 85, 95 ( 1 977) (.stating 
that First Amendment bars ban on "For Sale" signs intended to prevent "white flight") ; 
Dom Bishop, Comment, Fair Housing and the Constitutionality of Governmental 
Measures Affecting Community Ethnicity, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1229, 1 246-6.3 ( 1 988) 
(presen ting criteria which "measures affecting community ethnicity" would need to satisfy, 
in order to be constitutional); Thomas, supra note 61 , at 9M-66 (arguing that raciaUy 
explicit programs to enhance minority demand in white neighborhoods should be 
examined under intermediate scrutiny). The Linmarlc Court added, in dictum, that the 
township "surely can endeavor to create inducements to retain individuals who are 
considering selling their homes." 481 U.S. at 97. It is not dear that the dictum considered 
possible Equal Protection objections, nor that it would survive Croson and Adamnd. 
1 86. An eighth potential claim, which we do not address fully, focuses on the 
suggestion that people perceive their realty ownership differently than their ownership of 
corporate shares. For example, many of the most important values of home ownership are 
psychic and immeasurable, while the primary element of stock. ownership is pecuniary and 
unsentimental. See generally Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1 849, 
1905-{)6 ( 1987) (arguing that "context can be imegral to self-development," and that 
Qthose attributes and things identified with the person cannot be treated as completely 
commodified"). Here, too,  the differences should not be overstated. People do develop 
emotional attachments to stocks, and therefore place a premium on ownership of certain 
"brand-name� stocks. Conversely, the emotional element associated with home ownership 
does not alter the fact that real-estate is also an economic investment. In any evem, our 
model does not depend upon home ownership being viewed solely in economic terms. 
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mcyority.187 In the housing market, the various purchased units remain 
discrete, rather than representing segments of a larger asseL 
A second and related objection notes that the players in the two mar­
kets cannot precisely be analogized. In the market for corporate control, 
measures are aimed at altering the motivations of a large set of sharehold­
ers (the sellers) and a single potential acquiror of the corporation (the 
buyer} .  In the housing market, there is no single buyer, and, conse­
quently, demand-side measures cannot be incorporated in their original 
form if at all. 
The third claim relates to the relative financial importance of a 
house to most middle- and lower-income homeowners. Most investors in 
the stock market are able to diversify their investments, and therefore are 
not drastically affected by the penormance of a single stock. By contrast, 
a house ordinarily represents an enormous portion of the investment 
portfolio of most homeowners, and changes in home values have a much 
larger relative impact on the value of the investor's portfolio. 
· 
Fourth, while shareholders are motivated primarily by the expecta­
tion of pecuniary profit, homeowners look to their houses to provide 
much more. Homes are the repositories of people's lives. The decision 
to buy or sell a home is motivated not only by expectations of monetary 
profit, but also by such factors as leisure, aesthetics, availability of services, 
and preferences as to neighborhood character, including racial prefer­
ences. While all these factors are reflected in market price, they are 
highly idiosyncratic and, therefore, do not uniformly affect all market 
transactions. 
Fifth, the stock market suffers from fewer impedections than the 
housing market. The stock market is informationally superior, because 
most information about publicly traded stocks is widely known and inex­
pensive, while homeowners must often rely on gossip and anecdotes. In 
the stock market, there are many buyers and sellers and frequent transac­
tions; consequently, market prices are generally readily ascertainable_ In 
the housing market, there are fewer buyers and sellers, and market valua· 
187. The differences should not be oventated. While it is true that control over a 
majority of shares grants a control over the corporation in a way that control of a majority 
of houses cannot grant control over the neighborhood, the value of majority control is not 
complete. For example, if the corporate chaner specifies that: for decision x, a majority of 
90% + 1 is required; for decision y, a majority of 75% + 1 is required; and for decision z, a 
majority of 50% + I is required; then each of 10%, 25%, 50%, 50% + l ,  75% + 1, and 90% + 
I would be levels of control of significance_ Given varying degrees of voter participation in 
any given shareholder decision, the talismanic significance of the ftnl share beyond 50% ill 
further reduced. The independent dedsionmaking power of each homeowner is also 
incomplete. While mere is no formal institution called the neighborhood over which a 
group of homeowners can gain control, there are various community institutions (such as 
local school councils) in which majority groups of homeownen can take power. Thus, in 
bolh directions, lhe differences between lhe nature of lhe assets are not as stark as they 
might seem al finl glance. 
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tions are often subjective and speculative. Real-estate valuations are fur­
ther complicated by the fact that houses are not fungible like stocks.188 
Sixth, real-estate transactions often entail higher transactions costs. 
Of particular importance is the role of real-estate brokers. Not only do 
brokers create market "friction" by raising the cost of buying and selling, 
but they also create market "noise" by abusing their unique access to in­
formation to generate sales commissions. 
Finally, the market distortions evidenced in the housing and stock 
markets do not precisely correspond. In the market for corporate con­
trol, market distortions tend to place shareholders in a prisoners' di­
lemma. The payoff structures in a racially changing housing market are 
more varied. 
These differences between the two markets, while important, do not 
undermine the central insights of our model. The stock market is a 
highly developed and sophisticated market, which has provided an excel­
lent laboratory for the development of antidotes for market distortions. 
Distorted choice is the central concern of the stock market techniques 
that we adapt to the housing market, and it is the primary force behind 
resegregation in a society in which most homeowners prefer integration. 
The stock market techniques that we examine all have the ability to alter 
the payoff structure for market players, and, thereby, to change the play­
ers' incentives to engage in certain transactions. That is the feature we 
borrow in creating market mechanisms for countering pressures toward 
resegregation. Indeed, to the extent that homeowners have a larger por· 
tion of their portfolio invested in their houses, they are more sensitive to 
changes in realty values and, therefore, more easily panicked. 
Though we borrow the back-end defensive mechanisms from corpo­
rate law, we must alter the mechanisms somewhat to achieve our goals in 
the housing context. Regulation of tender offers and defensive measures 
adopted by corporations both aim at completely blocking certain take­
overs and allowing others to succeed in their entirety. By contrast, our 
aim in the housing market is to encourage and permit partial takeovers in 
all cases. To address this difference, we structure our defensive tech­
niques to become operative only after initial penetration of blacks into 
previously segregated white neighborhoods. Indeed, it is only after a suf­
ficient number of blacks have entered that we desire to discourage mass 
white exit. Additionally, in order to achieve full integration we must also 
encourage initial black entry into white neighborhoods. We address this 
concern in the next section. 
2. Limitations of Our Game-Theoretic Model. - The game-theoretic 
model that we employ is a highly stylized one. It includes only two players 
and two strategies, with no communication between the players. Reality 
1 88. It may also be noted that the stock. market is relatively less price inelastic. See 
Sidak &: Woodward, supra note l i S, at 8 1 7  ( noting that degree of inelasticity for stocks is 
"small if not trivial"). 
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is of course more complex. Nonetheless our model captures the basic 
dynamics of resegregation. Selling one's home is ultimately a binary 
choice between leaving or staying, irrespective of the large number of 
factors that influence this choice. Although there are more than two 
players in the housing market, the two-player model embodies the es­
sence of the dilemma each homeowner must face. In making her choice 
between selling and staying, each homeowner must ask herself what her 
neighbors will decide. The choices of the neighbors may be viewed in the 
aggregate, and represented in a two-player game fonnat. 189 
We assumed lack of communication among white homeowners in 
our initial model. Our techniques, however, introduced an element of 
signaling, which constitutes a form of communication between players. 
Also, we designed our supplementary measures to prevent the dissemina­
tion of misleading information to homeowners. In certain respects, our 
initial assumption of no coordination not only reflects reality, but is also 
desirable. As particularly apparent from a comparison with the stock 
market, information in the housing market is spotty and anecdotal. 
Moreover, past experience indicates that when white homeowners are al­
lowed to coordinate their buying and selling decisions-for instance, by 
means of restrictive covenants or zoning-they have used this power to 
exclude blacks. 190 Why this should happen in a world in which most 
whites prefer integration is a question beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, the answer may lie in the group dynamics that permit a strongly 
committed minority of segregationists to control the decisionmaking 
process.191 
Another salient feature of our game-theoretic model is its exclusive 
focus on the seller's side. Resegregation in the housing market can stem 
from two dynamics: black entry accompanied by white exit or white entry 
accompanied by black exit.192 Empirical studies point to the first of these 
18�t Randy Picker has done important work on extending game-theoretic analysis of 
legal issues beyond the standard two-player formaL See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in  
a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. L.  Rev. 
1225, 1226 (1997) (using computer models to simulate large numbers of simultaneous, 
multi-player games).  His approach would provide the natural next step for extending our 
model as well, although his work to date has not addressed this precise issue. Another 
fruitful line of inquiry for extending our model might emerge from relaxing our 
assumption of owner-occupied housing in order to consider the choice dynamics of 
renters. 
190. It is certainly possible that norms have changed during the past several decades 
and that coordination among white homeowners would consequently lead to greater 
integration, or, more precisely, would result  in the implementation of the expressed 
i ntegrative preferences of most white homeowners. However, there is no empirical data to 
support such a hypothesis at the present time. 
191 . See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society 257-77 (1960) (arguing 
that people allow their individual moral inclinations to be subjugated by group 
decision making) . 
192. The recent revitalization of inner cities has given rise to the question as to 
whether whi te entry into predominantly black neighborhoods will in fact lead to complete 
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two dynamics as the paramount cause of resegregation, and to white exit 
as the driving force behind this dynamic.195 For these reasons, our analy­
sis revolves around the seller's side of this dynamic. We do not intend to 
belittle the importance of static segregation-the phenomenon of erect­
ing barriers to the initial entry into a segregated neighborhood. That 
problem has been a central focus of the housing debate for several de­
cades, and it spurred the enactment of the Fair Housing Act. Empirical 
evidence suggests that the attempt to defeat static barriers to integration 
has not been entirely successful. Although this subject is extremely im­
portant, it lies beyond the scope of this Article.194 Notwithstanding the 
fact that resegregation, rather than static segregation, is the focus of our 
study, we recognize the intimate relationship between these two problems 
and we therefore tailored our remedies to resegregation so as not to con­
tribute to the problem of static segregation. In particular, we designed all 
our proposed measures to take effect after initial entry has occurred. 1 95 
C. The Threat of Peroerse Effocts 
A third set of objections might focus on the potentially perverse ef­
fects of the remedies we choose for rectifying distortions in homeowners' 
choices. First, one might charge that by bringing the remedies into play 
only in neighborhoods already experiencing high turnover or otherwise 
perceived of as "at risk," we are actually signaling to homeowners in such 
neighborhoods that resegregation is considered likely. If indeed our 
measures were to produce such unhelpful signals, the result might be to 
increase resegregation in cases in which homeowner choice is properly 
characterized as an assurance game. Second, one might argue that some 
of our measures, by increasing the cost of leaving once areas are per­
ceived as being "at risk," will actually accelerate the process of resegrega­
tion as homeowners rush to exit a neighborhood prior to its being de­
clared "at risk." 
We recognize the force of this criticism and therefore stress the im­
portance of carefully tailoring the magnitude and the timing of the cor-
resegregation. For a discussion of the process of gentrification and its effects, see generally 
Molly S. McUsic, Note, Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying 
Housing Market, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1835, 1838-41 ( 1988) . The empirical picture is not yet 
complete and an examination of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article. 
1 9S. See Cutler et ai., supra note 5, at 487; see aiso supra notes 16 Sc 66. 
194. Sander has suggested addressing the problem of static segregation by subsidizing 
black entry into white neighborhoods. See, e.g., Sander, The Problem of Fair Housing, 
supra note 5, at 931-32 (proposing "housing vouchers," which would operate analogously 
to food stamps, as a means to desegregate housing) ; Thomas, supra note 61 , at 943 
(discussing mortgage subsidies for minorities as a strategy to desegregate housing) . The 
suggestion is intriguing and warrants further investigation, particularly with respect to its 
constitutionality. 
195. Concerns of constitutionality present the major obstacle to more explicitly tying 
the onset of our remedies to the racial makeup of the neighborhood undergoing change. 
See supra Part V.A. 
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rective measures. Insufficiently large subsidies for community institutions 
might produce perverse signaling effects by failing to improve the quality 
of life for homeowners in the community while letting homeowners know 
that their neighborhood is considered at risk. Imposition of realty trans­
actions taxes at too late a time could produce a similar rush of resegrega· 
tion in anticipation of the soon-to-be-imposed taxes. Consequently, our 
proposed measures must be implemented with an eye toward those risks. 
Haphazard application of these measures-such as the implementation 
of equity insurance at levels that are too low-can be counterproductive. 
Furthermore, the implementing authority must be truly committed to in­
vesting the requisite funds at the right time in order to be successful. 
Half-measures and political pretense will backfire. Those pitfalls can be 
avoided by ongoing monitoring of the impact of the chosen measure in 
each particular community. Thus, bona fide implementation and contin­
uous monitoring are necessary for the successful attainment of stable 
integration. 
D. The Effect of Our Remedies on Racial Attitudes 
A final criticism that may be leveled against our proposal posits that 
our remedies treat the symptoms rather than the disease. Under this 
view, racism per se, not economics, prompts white homeowners to repeat­
edly resegregate themselves from their black neighbors.196 Economics 
and real-estate prices have nothing to do with it.197 Thus, changing the 
economic incentives of white homeowners would be of very little, if any, 
utility in encouraging integration. 
While our model recognizes the centrality of racial attitudes to suc­
cessful integration, and, indeed, we accept the claim that certain white 
homeowners would elect to resegregate themselves when black entry oc­
curs regardless of the price effecu of black entry, we unequivocally reject 
the claim that our model would be ineffective in promoting housing inte­
gration. Our response to this criticism is two-pronged. First, we argue 
that adoption of our proposed measures would foster "educated prefer­
ences" among white homeowners, which, in tum, would make integra­
tion more easily attainable. Second, we demonstrate that implementa· 
tion of our proposal would result in a separating equilibrium in which 
white segregationists would have to disclose their true colors and bear the 
consequences of their racism. 
1 .  Issues of Preference. - The developing field of behavioral law and 
economics198 has shown that preferences cannot be treated as immutable 
196. See generally supra notes 66-69 and accompan;ing text. 
197. Surprisingly, perhaps, thi� view is adopted by Kenneth Arrow. See, e.g., Arrow, 
supra note 2, at 97 (suggesting that �market-based theories give an inadequate account of 
the effects of racial discrimination on economic magnitudes and the effects of the 
economic system on racial discrimination�) . 
198. Behavioral law and economics is a relatively new field aimed at incorporating 
more sophisticated understandings of behavior and choice to modify the traditional 
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as in traditional law and economics. 199 In the present context, two of 
behavioral law and economics' insights are of particular importance­
first, the possibility of the development of educated preferences, and, sec· 
ond, the status quo bias in preferences. Studies in behavioral law and 
economics have demonstrated that individual preferences are adaptive 
and constructed rather than innate, and that they shift in response to the 
context in which the preference is being elicited and the baseline entitle­
ments set out by the law. Frequently people will express a preference for 
option A over option B because they lack sufficient information about 
option C. However, once additional information about C is disclosed, B 
may become the preferred option. 200 In the same vein, many of the ra­
cial 'perceptions of whites are rooted in misconceptions and pr�udices. 
Living in integrated neighborhoods may therefore "educate" a new set of 
preferences more amenable to integrated communities. 
Another phenomenon affecting the shaping of preferences is a 
widely observed bias in favor of the status quo. 201 This bias is often seen 
in the endowment effect-a psychological quirk that leads people to 
value an object more highly if it is in their possession.202 It can also be 
seen in the greater aversion people express for losses than the appetite 
they express for gains of equivalent magnitude. In a society in which 
most housing options are segregated, homeowners come to incorporate 
rational choice models employed by the economic analysis of law. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Introduction, m Behavioral Law and Economics 1 ,  I (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). 
Behavioral law and economics rc:jects the typical assumption of law and economics that "all 
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [ 1 ]  maximize their utility [2] 
from a stable set of preferences and [8) accumulate an optimal amount of infonnation and 
other inputs in a variety of markets. w Christine Jolts et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1 476 ( 1998) (quoting Gary S. Becker, The 
Economic Approach to Human Behavior 1 4  ( 1976) ). Instead, behavioral law and 
economics proposes that rationality is "bounded," as are willpower and self-interest. See 
Jolts et al., supra, at H76-79. The field's approach is not without its detractors. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1 551  ( 1998) (arguing that behavioral law and economics is not inconsistent with rational 
choice theory, not a unified theoretical model, and incapable of supporting productive 
future study) .  
199. For a discussion of preferences and how they are formed, see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 5� U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 1 29, 1 138-69 ( 1986). 
Sunstein divides preferences affected by legal rules into three categories: adaptive 
preferences, endowment effects, and ideology. However, Sunstein emphasizes that 
adaptive preference may not necessarily be the product of legal rules. Rather, they may be 
born of social nonns or preexisting distribution of wealth. See id. at 1 146. 
200. See Mark. Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. 
Legal Stud. 287, 287-88 (1996). 
201 .  See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 7, 8 ( 1988) (presenting a study showing that individuals 
exhibit a preference for the statuS quo across a range of decisions); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 1 75, 1 180 ( 1997) (arguing that prefe rences 
can be manipulated by changing individuals' perception of the status quo) . 
202. See Sunstein, supra note 199, at 1 1 50-52; Richard H. Thaler, Illusions and 
Mirages in Public Policy, 78 Pub. Interest 60, 64 ( 1 983) . 
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that status quo into their preferences. Thus, in a highly segregated 
neighborhood, white homeowners are likely to develop a bias against in­
tegration and concoct a justification for this bias in order to diminish the 
cognitive dissonance between the reality in which they live and their pref­
erences. This, however, may not be their true preference. Presented 
with a reality of an integrated neighborhood, white homeowners who pre­
viously harbored an aversion towards black neighbors are likely to open 
up to blacks and other minorities and fully accept them as neighbors.2os 
This, in tum, would dramatically reduce the magnitude of dynamic 
resegregation and facilitate integration. 
2. On Pooling and Separating Eqv.ilibrio.. - Since we explicitly recog­
nize the centrality of racial fixations to the process of dynamic resegrega­
tion, we do not argue that enacting our proposed measures will result in 
universal integration in the housing market. It is highly likely that certain 
whites would prefer to forego the benefits associated with integration and 
live instead in separate white communities. This, however, does not un­
dermine our remedial framework. An important virtue of our proposed 
measures is the information disclosure function they serve. At present, it 
is impossible to isolate the racist factor from the economic factor in ana­
lyzing the cause of dynamic resegregation. Specifically, the current legal 
regime has created a pooling equilibrium,204 in which segregationist 
white homeowners can mask their racist attitude as a pure economic con-
203. People often have two sets of preferences: first order preferences and second 
order preferences. While expressed preferences reflect the actor's second order 
preferences, they do not always reflect her true, or first order, preferences. For example, a 
smoker's decision to smoke often does not represent the true desire of many smokers to 
quit. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 
in Behavioral Law and Economics 1 87, 200 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); see also jon Elster, 
Ulysses and the Sirens 1 12-53 ( 1 979) {exploring the implications of contradictory beliefs 
and desires for the theory of rational behavior) . The distinction between first and second 
order preferences may provide another explanation for the paradox noted at the outset of 
this Article-the fact that most whites say they prefer integrau:d housing while the-y live in 
segregated neighborhoods. 
It should be noted that in addition to first· and second-order preferences, alternative 
explanations may exist for the disparity between attitudes and behavior. For example, a 
body of work in social psychology, which addresses the phenomenon of "subtyping," may 
explain why whiles might dislike blacks generally while liking particular blacks (or vice 
versa). For a brief explanation of this school, see Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping 
and Perceived Distributions of Social Characteristics: An Application to l ngroup-Outgroup 
Perception, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism 165, 166 (John F. Dovidio &: Samuei 
L. Gaertne r  eds., 1986) . 
204. On pooling and separating equilibria, and how legal rules cau be u11ed to 
transfonn the former into the latter, see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium 
in Competi tive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of lmpcrfect Information. 
90 QJ. Econ. 629, 634-37 ( 1976) (discussing "separating" and "pooling" equilibria i n  
insurance markets) ; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87, 94-95 ( 1 989) 
(suggesting that penalty default rules can be adopted to prevent inefficient pooling 
equilibria from forming) . But cf. Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 5 1  Stan. L. Rev. 1 547, 1 557-64 ( 1 999) (contending that the penalty damages 
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cern. This, in tum, makes the collection of information about the racist 
attitudes of white homeowners virtually impossible. Under the existing 
state of affairs, it is simply impossible to discern the true motivation of 
white homeowners who engage in dynamic resegregation. The partial 
information we have adversely impacts our ability to craft effective reme­
dies to the problem. 
Adoption of our proposed measures will solve this problem. The im­
plementation of our scheme will sever the existing coupling of racial and 
economic motivations, and will thus force segregationist whites to sepa­
rate themselves from integrationist white homeowners. Once the eco­
nomic incentive to resegregate has been neutralized, only white home­
owners who harbor racial bias will continue to engage in resegregation 
whenever a minority group enters their neighborhood. The resulting 
separation would enable policymakers to gain a correct assessment of the 
magnitude of the problem, and more importantly tailor remedies to ad­
dress it. Such remedies may take the form of targeted education but may 
also come in the form of increased taxation. In addition, the segregation­
ist will have to cope with the extralegal sanctions associated with their 
preferences, which they now can conveniently avoid by seeking refuge in 
economic rhetoric. Therefore, even if implementation of our scheme 
does not result in integration, it will constitute an important step toward 
this goal. 
CoNCLUSION 
Solving the problem of housing resegregation is of undeniable im­
portance to the achievement of full equality between the races in the 
United States. The three-game model we develop in this Article demon­
strates the complex web of motivations that underlie resegregation even 
in neighborhoods where white homeowners no longer harbor racial ani­
mus, or a preference for segregated housing. By combining this analytic 
framework with insights from the market for corporate control we devise 
techniques that alter the payoff structure of white homeowners in racially 
changing neighborhoods. We demonstrate that neutralizing the eco­
nomic incentive to resegregate is a necessary remedial step toward elimi­
nating segregated housing arrangements. 
We submit that implementation of our techniques-home-equity in­
surance, realty sales taXes, subsidies for community institutions, and re­
gional growth controls-can effectively diminish the scope of resegrega­
tion as well as place the cost of this dynamic on the parties that most 
strongly oppose housing integration. Moreover, our analysis can be ex­
tended to produce other techniques for combatting the economic distor­
tions that stand in the way of a more egalitarian society. 
rules proposed by Ayres and Gertner's analysis will not lead to perfect separation among 
various types of contractors) . 
